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CLOSING THE HEDGE FUND LOOPHOLE: 
THE SEC AS THE PRIMARY REGULATOR 
OF SYSTEMIC RISK 
CARY MARTIN SHELBY* 
Abstract: The 2008 financial crisis sparked a flurry of regulatory activity and 
enforcement in an attempt to reign in activity by banks, but other institutions 
have also been identified as potentially threatening to the stability of the finan-
cial markets. In particular, several empirical studies have revealed that systemic 
risk can be created and transmitted by hedge funds. In response to the risk creat-
ed by hedge funds, Congress granted the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”) authority under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to designate hedge funds 
as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“SIFIs”). Such a designation 
would automatically result in stringent capital constraints and limitations on li-
quidity risk on these non-bank institutions. Yet in over six years since FSOC has 
been granted this authority, it has failed to identify even one hedge fund as a SI-
FI. In the face of massive resistance and deregulatory initiatives introduced un-
der the Trump administration, it is highly unlikely to do so in the near future. 
The inability of FSOC to regulate systemically harmful funds is particularly 
troubling because several post-financial crisis studies have revealed that system-
ic risk can still be created and transmitted by hedge funds. Given FSOC’s inabil-
ity to close this hedge fund loophole, this Article argues that Congress should 
explore appointing the SEC as the primary regulator of hedge funds because: (1) 
hedge funds can still pose a systemic threat to the economy; (2) the transparency 
framework inherent in the federal securities laws can supply a more effective 
means for mitigating systemic risk than the prudential framework currently 
mandated for SIFIs; and (3) appointing the SEC in this regard would reduce the 
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fragmentation of the current regulatory structure which has been extended and 
complicated by the creation of FSOC. Although the federal securities laws are 
typically used to promote investor protection, this Article posits that enhancing 
transparency to hedge fund counterparties and investors can decrease systemic 
risk by empowering such market participants to better protect themselves 
against risk. Enhancing protection in this manner could in-turn weed out sys-
temically harmful funds from the marketplace, without imposing the severe cap-
ital constraints that would be mandated under FSOC’s model. 
INTRODUCTION 
From a structural perspective, there is a clear distinction between banks 
and investment funds. Banks are financial institutions that hold deposits, ex-
tend credit to individuals and businesses, or assist with the financing needs of 
corporations and other clients.1 Regulators have deemed these entities as be-
ing systemically harmful because the failure of a single bank could lead to 
simultaneous bank-runs and other financial calamities.2 As a result, banks are 
subject to a robust system of prudential regulation that restricts the extent to 
which these entities can extend capital to third parties.3 Such rules include 
stringent capital and reserve requirements, constraints on liquidity risk, and 
several other mandates designed to reduce the likelihood of a bank failure.4 
In contrast, investment funds are pooled vehicles that are invested in a 
basket of securities, bonds, and other instruments on behalf of large numbers 
of investors.5 Federal securities laws include mandated disclosure require-
ments for registered funds, which are rooted in investor protection princi-
ples.6 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is the regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 301, 306 (1987) (describing banks as, “firms that provide a particular bundle of financial 
services” such as liquidity and lending services for a range of individuals and businesses). 
 2 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regu-
lation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 782 (2010). 
 3 See generally Regulations, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.
gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm [https://perma.cc/3NRU-377R] (providing a comprehensive over-
view of the regulations that apply to banking entities). 
 4 Id.; see also MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION § 1.9 (3d ed. 2011) 
(describing broadly the current regulatory system for banks); Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Univers-
es and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. 
ON REG. 565, 568–69 (2014) (describing new system of mandatory public disclosure of infor-
mation). 
 5 See THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES § 1.01 (2016) 
(providing a description of investment company structures). 
 6 See infra notes 84–113 and accompanying text (summarizing the federal securities laws that 
apply to investment company structures). 
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body charged with effecting these laws.7 Although the failure of a particular 
fund could admittedly lead to massive investor losses, these entities were not 
historically viewed by regulators as being systemically harmful.8 Investors 
could previously absorb any losses associated with an investment fund failure 
and the fund’s demise would not lead to correlated defaults of other funds or 
financial institutions. 
In spite of these structural differences, financial innovation has signifi-
cantly blurred the distinction between the activities of banks and investment 
funds, creating unique challenges for regulators. Private funds, such as hedge 
funds for example, have more flexibility to incur leverage and pursue innova-
tive strategies, which can incorporate derivatives, illiquid instruments, and 
other exotic financial instruments.9 These flexibilities have created scenarios 
where funds can create and transmit systemic risk.10 They can now become 
“too big to fail,” heavily interconnected with other financial institutions, or 
significant participants in the shadow banking industry.11 For instance, the 
near failure of Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) revealed that a 
single hedge fund could become so highly leveraged and interconnected that 
its failure could expose its banking counterparties to significant losses, which 
could cripple the global economy.12 Moreover, a series of smaller funds can 
create and transmit systemic risk given the industry’s significant interconnect-
edness with insurance companies, prime brokers, and other hedge funds.13 In 
terms of the shadow banking industry, the securitization of debt instruments 
provided a means for hedge funds to participate in the transmission and dis-
tribution of credit, without being subject to significant regulation.14 During 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Division of Investment Management, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/
investment_about.shtml [https://perma.cc/W8L4-UFRW] (describing the SEC’s various roles in 
overseeing the investment fund industry). 
 8 See Dombalagian, supra note 2, at 782–83. 
 9 See infra notes 119–134 and accompanying text (summarizing common investment fund 
exemptions that permit private funds to pursue these flexibilities). 
 10 See infra notes 135–164 and accompanying text (explaining the various mechanisms 
through which hedge funds can create and transmit systemic risk). 
 11 See infra notes 135–164 and accompanying text. 
 12 See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2001) (providing a detailed account of the near failure of Long-
Term Capital Management, which was organized by two Nobel Prize winners who failed to pre-
dict the fund’s demise as it had a debt to equity ratio of over twenty-five to one). 
 13 See infra notes 141–164 and accompanying text (summarizing empirical research that has 
investigated the interconnectedness of hedge funds). 
 14 Karin Matussek, Hedge Funds Are Shadow Banks in Need of Regulation, Bafin Says, 
BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-13/
hedge-funds-are-shadow-banks-in-need-of-regulation-bafin-says (discussing how some European 
regulators view hedge funds as shadow banks and feel that they should be regulated as such). But 
see Andrew Baker, Hedge Funds Are Not Shadow Banks: Shadow Banking Is the New Bogeyman, 
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the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, hedge funds were avid 
participants in these OTC derivative markets.15 
Scholars have long debated the appropriate regulatory body and frame-
work to oversee these emerging systemic risk concerns.16 Some have ex-
pressed doubts with simply extending the SEC’s authority over these entities 
and have suggested that systemically harmful hedge funds be subject to a de-
gree of prudential regulation that would extend beyond the SEC’s investor 
protection mandate.17 Another solution proposed by commentators is that a 
separate administrative body should be created to oversee all systemically 
harmful financial institutions, a power comparable to the authority granted to 
the Federal Stability Oversight Counsel (“FSOC”).18 This “super-regulator” 
would use information collected from existing administrative agencies to reg-
ulate such institutions. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) reconciled this debate by creating a new regulatory 
framework for hedge funds under this extensive legislation.19 In regulating 
systemically harmful funds, the Dodd-Frank Act granted authority to a newly 
                                                                                                                           
But Don’t Include Hedge Funds, FIN. TIMES 3 (May 15, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/
611b8e26-7d8d-11e0-b418-00144feabdc0 (arguing that hedge funds are not significant partici-
pants in the shadow banking industry and further claiming that they are distinctly different from 
banks in that “[t]hey do not take deposits, do not undertake maturity transformation nor benefit 
from implicit or explicit taxpayer guarantees”). 
 15 Daniel Fisher, A Dangerous Game: Hedge Funds Have Gotten Rich from Credit Deriva-
tives, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2006, 12:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1016/040.html 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160906124514/http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1016/040.html] 
(providing data on the participation of hedge funds in OTC derivative markets and specifically 
noting that “[h]edge funds account for 58% of the trading in [credit] derivatives”). 
 16 See infra notes 165–184 and accompanying text (outlining the scholarly debate on the 
proper administrative authority that should be granted for systemically harmful hedge funds). 
 17 John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a 
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 776 (2009) (suggesting that, as part of a broader “regulatory 
consolidation,” the Federal Reserve should be given authority to regulate hedge funds). 
 18 See, e.g., Ian Beattie & Sarah O’Connor, Bernanke Calls for Powerful Regulator, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/6d4f943a-0d6e-11de-8914-0000779fd2ac 
(highlighting Bernanke’s support of a new “super” regulator to oversee all systemically harmful 
institutions); Jeff Casale, Industry Group Supports Systemic Risk Regulator, BUS. INS. (Mar. 5, 
2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20090305/NEWS/200015653/industry-
group-supports-systemic-risk-regulator [https://perma.cc/8USW-72F3] (reporting on “[a] group of 
representatives of the insurance industry and other financial services companies [who] told a 
House panel Thursday that they support the idea of a systemic risk regulator as a means of stabi-
lizing the current financial market and to prevent future collapse”); see also Hilary J. Allen, Put-
ting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1092 
(2015) (arguing that regulators should be further consolidated “into a single well-resourced pru-
dential regulatory agency” while also advocating for the termination of the FSOC). 
 19 See infra notes 185–210 and accompanying text (summarizing new registration require-
ments for hedge funds promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
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created administrative agency, FSOC.20 This agency is “broadly charged” 
with promoting stability over the financial markets.21 In effectuating this mis-
sion, FSOC has the power to designate both “bank entities” and “nonbank en-
tities,” such as hedge funds for example, as “systemically important financial 
institutions” (“SIFIs”).22 Once a nonbank entity is classified as a SIFI, it is 
then subject to enhanced regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act that would be 
similar to the prudential regulation typically imposed upon banks.23 The Fed-
eral Reserve would then supervise and implement this enhanced regulation.24 
FSOC has since developed a comprehensive three-stage review process for 
determining whether nonbank entities should be designated as SIFIs.25 In 
summary, entities that have at least $50 billion in total consolidated assets can 
be designated as a SIFI if FSOC determines that it is a systemic threat after 
evaluating the following characteristics: (i) size, (ii) interconnectedness, (iii) 
substitutability, (iv) leverage, (v) liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and 
(vi) existing regulatory scrutiny.26 
Critics have questioned whether the costs of designating a fund as a SIFI 
would exceed the benefits.27 In terms of assessing the costs, if a hedge fund 
were designated as a SIFI and therefore subject to prudential regulation, it 
could destroy its ability to pursue its underlying strategy.28 Imposing this de-
gree of regulation could in turn hamper the returns of hedge fund investors. 
With these potentially destructive costs, there is a high likelihood that a hedge 
fund identified as a SIFI would sue FSOC for an arbitrary and capricious des-
ignation.29 In terms of assessing the benefits of this framework, it is question-
able whether a SIFI model can actually reduce the unique categories of sys-
temic risk created by the hedge fund industry.30 As discussed above, hedge 
funds must first have at least $50 billion in total consolidated assets in order 
                                                                                                                           
 20 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012). 
 21 Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/YL88-6WAE]. 
 22 See Andy Winkler, Primer: FSOC’s SIFI Designation Process for Nonbank Financial 
Companies, AM. ACTION FORUM (Sept. 3, 2014), http://americanactionforum.org/research/primer-
fsocs-sifi-designation-process-for-nonbank-financial-companies [https://perma.cc/6QD7-GX2J] 
(explaining in detail how the SIFI designation process works under the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 23 12 C.F.R. § 1310.10 (2016). 
 24 Id.; see also id. § 1310.02 (noting that “[t]he term ‘Board of Governors’ means the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System”). 
 25 See infra notes 194–210 and accompanying text (explaining specific components of the 
five-factor test for SIFI designations). 
 26 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310, app. A. 
 27 See infra notes 211–225 and accompanying text (evaluating notable criticisms to FSOC’s 
authority over nonbank SIFIs). 
 28 See infra notes 211–225 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 211–225 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 211–225 and accompanying text. 
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to be classified as a SIFI. Although this threshold may indeed capture funds 
that are deemed “too big to fail,” it will not capture smaller funds that are 
heavily interconnected with other financial intermediaries. Commentators 
have also queried whether FSOC could appropriately evaluate the complexi-
ties of the industry and have instead advocated for models that increase mar-
ket efficiency.31 Because the information gathered by FSOC is deemed confi-
dential, it will have a limited effect on increasing the efficiency of the hedge 
fund marketplace. 
For these reasons, FSOC may never designate a hedge fund as a SIFI. 
Within the six years since the Dodd-Frank Act has been passed, FSOC has yet 
to do so. The council has encountered a variety of challenges such as defi-
ciencies in the systemic risk data collected by the SEC, criticisms to systemic 
risk studies sanctioned by FSOC, and massive resistance to the SIFI designa-
tion process by numerous industry participants.32 Moreover, the new admin-
istration has introduced several deregulatory initiatives designed to repeal 
major portions of the Dodd-Frank Act.33 It is not yet clear how these initia-
tives will impact FSOC’s authority to designate hedge funds as SIFIs. Even if 
these initiatives never come to fruition, the newly appointed chairperson of 
the council is Steven Terner Mnuchin34 who is a former hedge fund adviser 
with deep ties to the industry.35 His appointment could heavily influence the 
extent to which FSOC focuses on the hedge funds in pursuing its mission to 
ensure financial stability. As such, it is highly unlikely that FSOC will desig-
nate a fund as a SIFI in the near future even if its power is preserved under 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  
This hedge fund loophole is problematic because the industry is predict-
ed to grow significantly in coming years. Public pension plans account for 
close to thirty percent of the aggregate capital invested in private funds.36 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Michael T. Cappucci, Prudential Regulation and the Knowledge Problem: Towards a New 
Paradigm of Systemic Risk Regulation, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 30–32 (2014). 
 32 See infra notes 226–252 and accompanying text (providing in-depth account of FSOC’s 
failure to identify a fund as a SIFI). 
 33 Fred Barbash & Renae Merle, Trump to Order Regulatory Rollback Friday for Finance 
Industry Starting with Dodd-Frank, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/03/trump-to-order-rollback-friday-of-regulations-aimed-at-
finance-industry-top-aide-says/?utm_term=.c379cf783b79 [https://perma.cc/65EZ-PCFE] (dis-
cussing the Trump administration’s plans for financial deregulation). 
 34 Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/
Pages/Secretary.aspx [https://perma.cc/6DZ8-SNT5]. 
 35 See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Trump’s Treasury Pick Moves in Secretive 
Hedge Fund Circles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/business/
dealbook/steven-mnuchin-trump-treasury-hedge-funds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G53F-QLQD] 
(discussing Mnuchin’s relationship with the hedge fund industry). 
 36 PREQIN, 2015 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT 8 (2015). 
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This figure will likely continue to grow as pension plans face funding chal-
lenges due to past market turmoil, swelling life-spans, and the simultaneous 
retirement of millions of baby-boomers.37 Despite reports that the industry 
has failed to beat the markets, hedge funds will likely face increasing demand 
when the markets begin their inevitable descent.38 Hedge funds tend to out-
perform the markets during times of market distress given their abilities to 
pursue flexible strategies such as short-trading and other hedging strategies.39 
Post-financial crisis studies have also found that systemic risk is still a grow-
ing concern in this niche industry.40 As the industry grows, these systemic 
risk threats will likely expand in the coming years. 
Given FSOC’s inability to close this hedge fund loophole, this Article 
argues that Congress should explore appointing the SEC as the primary regu-
lator of systemic risk because: (1) hedge funds can still pose a systemic threat 
to the economy; (2) the transparency framework inherent in the federal secu-
rities laws can supply a more effective means for mitigating systemic risk 
than the prudential framework currently mandated for SIFIs; and (3) appoint-
ing the SEC in this regard would reduce the fragmentation of the current reg-
ulatory structure that has been extended and complicated by the creation of 
FSOC.41 In making this argument this Article implicitly acknowledges that 
although financial innovation has blurred the distinction between private 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Christopher Swann, Why Hedge Funds Still Make Sense for Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/dealbook/why-hedge-funds-still-
make-sense-for-pension-funds.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ6P-VJN6] (discussing the reasons why 
pension funds need to reduce costs). 
 38 See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text (discussing how hedge funds often outper-
form declining markets). 
 39 See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 262–269 and accompanying text (discussing recent studies that have ex-
plored systemic risk in the hedge fund industry). 
 41 For the sake of clarity, this Article does not argue that FSOC should be dismantled. It nar-
rowly argues that its supervision over the asset management industry should be delegated to the 
SEC. FSOC’s supervision over other nonbank entities could in fact be justified, particularly if the 
nonbank entities are exempt from federal oversight. The insurance industry for example is pre-
dominantly regulated by the states, irrespective of the push by certain interest groups to subject 
these entities to federal regulation. See Proposed Federal Insurance Regulation, NAT’L ASS’N 
INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_federal_insurance_regulator.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7BAJ-5XSB] (discussing basic structure of the insurance industry and how pro-
posed federal regulation might change it). In terms of the multiple categories of asset managers, 
this Article limits its analysis to hedge funds for a variety of reasons. First, hedge funds are the 
category of private funds that pose the greatest systemic threat to the economy according to the 
empirical research in this area. See infra notes 135–164 and accompanying text. With respect to 
funds that are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, FSOC seems to have implic-
itly delegated its supervision over these entities to the SEC because registered funds are already 
subject to layers of regulation under the federal securities laws. See infra notes 84–104 and ac-
companying text. 
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funds and banks, this line has not yet been eliminated. The SEC is likely the 
ideal administrative agency to accommodate the fundamental differences be-
tween these industries, while regulating the increasing “publicness” of private 
funds in an effective manner.42 
Enhanced transparency is typically deployed under the federal securities 
laws as a mechanism to promote investor protection.43 The relationship be-
tween investor protection and systemic risk, however, has been grossly ne-
glected by researchers in this area.44 This Article attempts to delve into this 
analysis by demonstrating the ways in which increasing transparency can 
serve to reduce systemic risk in the hedge fund industry. More specifically, it 
argues that enhancing market-wide transparency for hedge fund counterpar-
ties and investors can empower such market participants to better protect 
themselves against risk, thereby potentially weeding out systemically harmful 
funds. Hedge fund counterparties and investors are admittedly highly sophis-
ticated prime brokerage firms, that often perform extensive due diligence on 
prospective investments.45 Yet, these parties have frequently encountered dif-
ficulties in assessing the creditworthiness of funds given the complexity of 
their strategies and operations.46 Even if they perform significant due dili-
gence on a single fund, or multiple funds, they can still encounter difficulties 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See generally Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in 
the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV. 405 (2016) (analyzing the ways in which the law 
should regulate the increasing “publicness” of hedge funds which includes systemic risk, hedge 
fund activism, third-party litigation funding, and investment in distressed economies). 
 43 See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.
shtml [https://perma.cc/MJV7-U6Z8] (discussing the purposes of registration under the federal 
securities laws). 
 44 Although many scholars have failed to address this issue, some have engaged in thoughtful 
discussions on the integral relationship between investor protection and systemic risk. Professor 
Olufunmilayo Arewa from UC Irvine School of Law has expressed “the need for regulatory 
frameworks that comprehensively address systemic risk as a core aspect of both investor protec-
tion and market integrity and stability.” Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Trading Places: Securities Regu-
lation, Market Crisis, and Network Risk 63 (Northwestern Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law, Law & 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-01, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324951; see also Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link 
Between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 4 FIU L. REV. 435, 436 (2009) (argu-
ing that “consumer financial protection can, and must, serve a role not only in protecting individu-
als from excessive risk, but also in protecting markets from systemic risk”). 
 45 See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regula-
tory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 992–95 (providing data on the 
extensive due diligence undertaken by hedge fund investors and generally concluding that these 
investors can appropriately protect themselves); see also Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
240, 287–88 (2009) (positing that hedge funds often provide extensive disclosures to investors and 
that the industry is generally trending toward increased transparency). 
 46 See infra notes 293–312 and accompanying text (identifying some of the challenges that 
investors and counterparties have encountered in deciphering hedge fund strategies). 
648 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:639 
in optimizing hedge fund selections given the lack of standardization in how 
risk is reported.47 Mandating standardized risk disclosures for hedge funds 
would essentially give investors and counterparties a mechanism to more eas-
ily identify high quality managers of risk. This could in-turn force systemical-
ly harmful funds out of the market. Standardized disclosures that are tailored 
to the proprietary needs of hedge funds could also be less disruptive to the 
hedge fund industry in comparison to prudential regulation, especially if the 
disclosures are carefully designed to protect proprietary information. 
The disclosure items developed by the SEC should parallel the relevant 
factors that FSOC currently evaluates in determining whether a hedge fund 
would qualify as a SIFI. These factors are: (i) size, (ii) interconnectedness, 
(iii) substitutability, (iv) leverage, and (v) liquidity risk.48 The SEC should 
also form a committee comprised of experts from a range of fields such as 
legal, finance, economic, and quantitative analysis, to effectively develop 
these disclosures which would be publicly available on the SEC’s website. 
Such experts can provide creative mechanisms for standardizing these highly 
complex items. For example, network science can provide useful insights as 
to how to measure interconnectedness.49  
With respect to reducing the fragmentation of the current regulatory 
structure, the SEC has admittedly fallen short in preventing several scandals 
and frauds that have led to significant investor losses.50 Nevertheless, this 
Article argues that lawmakers should instead dedicate resources to reforming 
existing agencies instead of creating additional layers of ineffective regulation 
that could lead to repeated failures, undue complexities, and wasted re-
sources. The SEC is better situated to regulate systemic risk in this regard 
because of its historic expertise in regulating the asset management industry 
under the federal securities laws.51 And although the SEC has historically 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A Proposal to 
Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87 
(2012) (arguing that the lack of standardized procedures for measuring the risks of hedge funds 
can make it difficult for investors to optimize hedge fund selections amongst the thousands of 
available options). 
 48 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310, app. A(II)(d)(1) (2016). 
 49 Stefan Thurner & Sebastian Poledna, DebtRank-Transparency: Controlling Systemic Risk 
in Financial Networks, 3 SCI. REP., no. 1888, 2013, at 2. 
 50 See infra notes 334–342 and accompanying text (highlighting the SEC’s failure to prevent 
the severe investor losses that resulted from the Madoff scandal, even though he was registered as 
an adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). 
 51 See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers 
Act Standing the Test of Time, Opening Remarks at the 75th Anniversary of the Investment Com-
pany Act and Investment Advisers Act (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/im-
40-acts-75th-anniv-chair-white-09292015.html [https://perma.cc/6BCQ-RDXQ] (discussing the 
SEC’s long history of regulating the asset management industry). 
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been restricted to promoting investor protection, the agency is developing an 
expertise in managing systemic risk with respect to registered investment 
funds. The SEC now has a new division that is partially dedicated to mitigat-
ing systemic risk, it has implemented new stress-testing measures on regis-
tered funds, and it recently created tailored regulation to deal with the system-
ic threats posed by money-market funds.52 
This Article contributes to the expanding area of scholarship which gen-
erally explores the extent to which transparency can be used to mitigate sys-
temic risk. For example, Professor Viral V. Acharya from the New York Uni-
versity Stern School of Business has recently proposed that dealers disclose 
their derivatives positions on a market-wide basis which would incentivize 
such dealers to efficiently lower their counterparty risk.53 Professor Anita I. 
Anand from the University of Toronto School of Law sought to establish a 
clear connection between securities regulation and systemic risk.54 This Arti-
cle is distinctive in that it is the first to analyze comparable claims as a solu-
tion to FSOC’s failure to regulate systemically harmful funds. It also provides 
a novel framework for standardizing systemic risk disclosures, and borrows 
concepts from network science such as “PageRank” and “DebtRank” to ex-
plore creative mechanisms for measuring interconnectedness. 
Part I of this Article provides the foundational framework for the pro-
ceeding analysis.55 It begins with a detailed description of the federal securi-
ties laws that apply to the investment fund industry.56 It then highlights the 
fundamental differences between these laws, and the prudential regulations 
that further constrain banking entities.57 Part II illuminates the primary prob-
lem addressed in this Article in that the distinction between private invest-
ment funds and banking entities began to blur.58 Hedge funds could potential-
ly create and transmit systemic risk, although they were exempt from signifi-
cant regulation.59 With this regulatory conundrum, Part II delves into the reg-
ulatory response encapsulated by the creation of FSOC.60 Part II continues by 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See infra notes 334–342 and accompanying text (providing a brief description of the SEC’s 
new systemic risk measures, which coincide with the increasing relationship between investor 
protection and systemic risk). 
 53 Viral V. Acharya, A Transparency Standard for Derivatives, in BANQUE DE FRANCE, FI-
NANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 81, 88–89 (2013). 
 54 See Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 941, 944 (2010) (arguing that systemic risk is relevant to securities regulation and therefore 
that increased transparency is a valuable goal to be achieved by these laws). 
 55 See infra notes 68–113 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 84–104 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 105–113 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 119–269 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 119–164 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 165–225 and accompanying text. 
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dissecting the reasons behind FSOC’s failure to designate a hedge fund as a 
SIFI, and concludes with a detailed description of the hedge fund loophole 
created by FSOC’s inaction.61 Part III explores the solution presented in this 
Article.62 The SEC is likely the next best alternative to effectively regulate 
systemically harmful funds.63 It further proposes that the transparency man-
date provided under federal securities laws could serve to increase financial 
stability and reduce systemic risk.64 Part III further explains how designating 
the SEC in this regard could reduce the balkanization of the current regulato-
ry structure.65 
I. ORIGINAL LEGISLATION ENHANCES INVESTOR PROTECTION 
This section is largely dedicated to outlining the contours of the federal 
securities laws. Investor protection harms plagued the investment fund indus-
try during the period preceding the Great Depression, which incentivized 
Congress to pass laws that ensured the accuracy of information with respect 
to these entities. Part I begins by expounding on the particulars of these harms 
and summarizes the laws that are tailored to this industry.66 It then concludes 
by explaining how these laws are distinctive from the prudential rules that 
apply to banks.67  
A. Industry Growth Reveals Investor Protection Harms 
Investment funds such as mutual funds and money-market funds are a 
predominant savings mechanism for individual households. The Investment 
Company Institute has estimated that investment funds collectively manage 
over $18.2 trillion for over 90 million individuals in the United States.68 
Households across the country rely on these entities to fund retirement, save 
for college, and support several other categories of expenses.69 In fact, as of 
June 30, 2014, “[a]bout 64 percent of 401(k) plan assets were held in mutual 
funds such as equity, balanced, bond, and money market funds.”70 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See infra notes 226–269 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 274–342 and accompanying text. 
 63 See infra notes 274–333 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 274–333 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra notes 334–342 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 68–104 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 105–113 and accompanying text. 
 68 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW 
OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 6 (55th ed. 2015). 
 69 Id. at 33. 
 70 Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, INV. CO. INST., https://www.ici.org/policy/
retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k [https://perma.cc/ECK4-UPDN]. 
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As background, these entities are essentially pooled vehicles that are 
created by professional advisers who solicit investments from a large number 
of investors.71 Advisers then invest the resulting pool into a variety of finan-
cial instruments, which can include equities, bonds, and cash-instruments, 
with the hopes of earning a sizable return to distribute to investors.72 Owning 
a single mutual fund share could thus provide investors with automatic expo-
sure to a wide variety of investments and companies. Investors often prefer 
these vehicles over investing directly into the stock market because of the 
immediate access to a diversified pool of instruments, as well as the provided 
expertise of the advisers.73 Despite these benefits, investment fund investors 
are particularly vulnerable because they are entrusting fund advisers to ap-
propriately manage their allocated capital. There is also a conflict of interest 
that exists between these two parties. Investors seek to pay the lowest fees 
possible so as to preserve their pro rata share of returns, while advisers desire 
the highest possible fees to maximize their own personal profits.74 
 Even still, the investment fund industry experienced a profound growth 
spurt during the period preceding the Great Depression. As one source noted, 
“[p]rior to 1921 . . . only 40 investment trusts came into existence. During the 
next five years, 139 more were created, and in 1927 alone another 140 were 
established.”75 This rapid growth however revealed the pervasive investor 
protection issues that such investors faced during this time period. Shortly 
following the stock market crash of 1929, a study administered by Congress 
revealed the full extent of the fraudulent schemes that permeated this indus-
try.76 For example, many fraudulent advisers would operate funds as Ponzi 
schemes, where instead of implementing a legitimate investment strategy, 
advisers relied on new investments to fund their fees.77 Another popular 
scheme ensured that advisers maintained control over all major decisions with 
                                                                                                                           
 71 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT 
COMPANY REGULATION xvii (1992) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY]. 
 72 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 5, § 1.01. 
 73 See Mutual Funds Can Help Lower Investing Risks, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.
com/mutual-funds [https://perma.cc/S4KH-3DLE] (discussing the various benefits of investing in 
mutual funds over investing in the stock market). 
 74 See PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 71, at 255–56 (explaining the 1940 Act’s 
governance of conflicts of interest). 
 75 MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOW’S END: THE CRASH OF 1929, at 129 (2001). 
 76 See Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, The Exciting World of Investment Com-
pany Management, Remarks at the American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment 
Company Regulation and Compliance Conference (June 14, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch500.htm [https://perma.cc/NR84-2BJ8] (discussing investment trust study that was 
published in 1936). 
 77 John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management Regulation: 
1936–1942, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341, 353 (2012) (noting that “[s]ome funds turned out to be 
Ponzi schemes”). 
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respect to the pool.78 They would do this by selling non-voting stock to the 
general public, while retaining voting stock for themselves at a lower price.79 
Fraudulent advisers would also unload their personal stock holdings into in-
vestment funds at unfavorable prices, take interest-free loans directly from the 
pool’s net assets, or adopt inordinately complex strategies that exposed inves-
tors to excessive losses.80 To make matters worse, disclosures with respect to 
the underlying strategies of investment funds were often minimal or non-
existent.81 Even if disclosures were made to investors, advisers would regu-
larly stray away from the provided strategy, or fail to sufficiently diversify the 
pool’s investments as promised.82 According to the SEC, investors suffered 
extraordinary losses during the early 1930s as a result of these abuses.83 
B. Heightened Regulation Under the 1940 Act and the Advisers Act 
The inaugural Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) were the first among a series of 
laws designed to federally regulate the public capital markets.84 They are fre-
quently referred to as the “truth in securities” laws because they mandate that 
companies disclose all material information with respect to any securities sold 
to the general public.85 Congress refrained from passing legislation that 
would require regulators to investigate the merits of each particular offering. 
Investors are instead empowered to make optimal investment decisions 
through the mandated disclosure of material information related to various 
aspects of the underlying issuer. President Roosevelt stated in a 1933 speech 
to Congress that “[t]here is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that eve-
ry issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompa-
nied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important ele-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Roye, supra note 76 (observing that “investment companies were structured to ensure 
that they remained under the control of their sponsors” as opposed to their stockholders). 
 79 THE PECORA REPORT: THE 1934 REPORT ON THE PRACTICES OF STOCK EXCHANGES FROM 
THE “PECORA COMMISSION” 339 (photo. reprint 2009) (1934) [hereinafter PECORA REPORT] (out-
lining the abuses of the American investment fund industry). 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. at 348; see also The Regulation of Management Investment Trusts for the Protection of 
Investors, 46 YALE L.J. 1211, 1215 (1937) (discussing criticism of the investment fund industry’s 
lack of transparency). 
 82 PECORA REPORT, supra note 79, at 348–49. 
 83 See Roye, supra note 76 (noting specifically that “[t]he SEC estimated that between 1929 
and 1936, investment company shareholders lost 40 per cent [sic] of their investments”). 
 84 See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC (Oct. 1, 2013) https://www.sec.
gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 [hereinafter Laws That Govern] (describing the major laws that 
regulate the securities industry in the United States). 
 85 Id. 
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ment attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”86 Pro-
tecting investors from the ubiquitous abuses that led to the Great Depression 
was the primary goal of Congress in adopting the federal securities laws. 
In effectuating this goal, Congress incorporated the views implicit in a 
well-known quote by Louis D. Brandeis. He famously stated, “Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient police-
man.”87 In other words, broadcasting information to large audiences can serve 
to uncover malfeasance and bad behavior. In the context of securities regula-
tion, such useful information includes a detailed description of the company, 
the intended use of proceeds received from the offering, audited financial 
statements, and several other categories of information.88 Any issuers that fail 
to disclose such information are potentially subject to the civil liability provi-
sions under these laws.89 Issuers that engage in fraudulent conduct could also 
face criminal liability. 
In response to the particular abuses that pervaded the investment fund 
industry, Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 
Act”), which includes extensive investor protection guarantees that extend 
beyond the initial round of federal securities laws.90 The 1940 Act is similarly 
structured to protect investors from fraud, while equipping them with the nec-
essary tools to make better decisions with respect to their investment fund 
allocations. Investment funds were already subject to regulation under the 
Securities and Exchange Acts, as they were required to register initial public 
offerings under the Securities Act, and file periodic reports under the Ex-
change Act. Nevertheless, Congress deemed these laws insufficient from an 
investor protection standpoint. Congress also found that protecting this dis-
creet category of investors was of a “national public interest” because, among 
other reasons, the collective savings of the country was closely intertwined 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message from the President—Regulation of Security Issues Pre-
sented to the Senate, 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933). 
 87 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 88 See Marianne M. Jennings, The Efficacy of Merit Preview of Common Stock Offerings: Do 
Regulators Know More Than the Market?, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 211, 212 (1993) (explaining that 
“Congress created a system of pre-sale registration and approval for proposed offerings through 
the Federal Securities Act of 1933” and noting that it did so “[b]ased on the rationale that disclo-
sure of a firm’s past events serves some value investors in making their investment decisions”); 
Laws That Govern, supra note 84 (discussing information that must be disclosed as part of the 
Federal Securities Act’s registration requirements). 
 89 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (2012); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78ff 
(2012). 
 90 See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.02 (outlining the arduous disclosure requirements that 
apply to registered funds); Roye, supra note 76 (outlining how the 1940 Act was a direct response 
to the misconduct that pervaded the early investment fund industry). 
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with the industry.91 Thus, the 1940 Act extends the SEC’s investor protection 
mandate by expanding the transparency requirements provided under the Se-
curities and Exchange Acts, restricting retail investor access to risky invest-
ments, and implementing extensive governance reforms to protect against the 
inherent conflicts of interest that exist between advisers and their investors. 
With respect to transparency, funds that are registered under the 1940 
Act must disclose detailed information regarding investment strategies, man-
agement fees, portfolio turnover, and several other items that are unique to 
investment fund structures.92 In terms of enhancing governance, the 1940 Act 
prohibits several categories of conflict of interest transactions between such 
registered funds and its related parties.93 For instance, advisers are prohibited 
from directly transacting with the fund so as to prevent advisers from negoti-
ating favorable terms to the detriment and exclusion of underlying inves-
tors.94 The 1940 Act further mandates that registered funds be governed by a 
board of directors to effectively serve as a “watchdog” over the adviser to 
further protect against conflicts of interest.95 In terms of restricting access to 
risky instruments, registered funds are broadly prohibited from incurring ex-
cessive indebtedness on behalf of the pool.96 For instance, taking out a loan to 
bolster fund returns could potentially run afoul of the 1940 Act.97 Trading in 
derivatives can also constitute indebtedness and violate the 1940 Act because 
derivatives are intrinsically leveraged instruments where one party will inevi-
tably incur losses once the transaction closes.98 Parties trading derivatives 
must also regularly post margin or collateral over the course of the transac-
tion.99 As a result, registered funds are heavily restricted from trading in de-
rivatives.100 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)–(b) (2012) (listing various 
ways in which the investment fund industry affects the national public interest). 
 92 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.02 (outlining in great detail the many disclosure require-
ments that apply to registered funds under the 1940 Act). 
 93 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a). 
 94 See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.01(listing ways in which certain individuals associated 
with the fund may not directly transact with it). 
 95 PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY, supra note 71, at 253. 
 96 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18. 
 97 Id. § 80a-18(c). Section 18(f) however allows open-ended funds to borrow capital from a 
bank if, immediately after the bank borrowing, the fund’s total net assets are at least three times 
total aggregate borrowings (300% asset coverage). Id. § 80a-18(f). 
 98 See LEMKE ET AL., supra note 5, § 8.06(2)(b)(ii) (“The SEC and its staff generally view any 
transaction that exposes a fund’s shareholders to a substantial degree of risk of loss through a 
leveraged investment to be a senior security or, at least, to raise senior security concerns under 
Section 18.”). 
 99 Id. 
 100 The 1940 Act does provide some leeway for derivatives trading by registered funds if such 
contracts are sufficiently “covered” as defined under applicable rules. Fund advisers can “cover” 
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In conjunction with the 1940 Act, Congress simultaneously passed the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) which provides additional 
investor protection guarantees by subjecting investment company advisers to 
an additional layer of regulation.101 Advisers registered under this law have 
heightened fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of their clients in dispel-
ling their accompanying investment advice.102 In addition, they must provide 
disclosures to their clients regarding their underlying advisory business. 
These disclosures include material information relating to their business prac-
tices, disciplinary history, certain conflicts of interest, and other material in-
formation.103 Additionally, the SEC has the power to randomly inspect regis-
tered advisers to ensure compliance with these various provisions.104 
C. Distinction Between Investor Protection and Prudential Regulation 
Overall, both the 1940 Act and Advisers Act expanded the SEC’s inves-
tor protection mandate with respect to the investment fund industry. As re-
flected in these laws, investor protection is usually enforced by increasing 
transparency to the broader marketplace. Enhanced transparency serves to 
protect individual investors by unveiling the truth behind their underlying 
investments. Even if investors fail to read mandated disclosures, the efficient 
market hypothesis postulates that a wide-range of market participants are in-
stantaneously responding to this information, helping to ensure the accuracy 
of prices for publicly traded securities.105 Mandated disclosure systems fur-
ther deter issuers from engaging in fraudulent conduct because they are close-
ly monitored by the SEC as well as by various market participants. The 1940 
Act does utilize investor protection mechanisms that extend beyond simply 
enhancing transparency such as restrictions on leverage, derivatives, and il-
                                                                                                                           
derivative contracts by earmarking or segregating liquid securities equal in value to the fund’s 
potential exposure from the leveraged transaction. Advisers can also cover an obligation by direct-
ly owning the instrument underlying that obligation. For instance, a fund that wants to take a short 
position in a certain stock can comply with the 1940 Act by owning an equivalent long position in 
that stock. These transactions must also be closely monitored by boards of directors and funds 
must consistently assess accuracy and completeness of their disclosure relating to derivatives. Id. 
 101 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012). 
 102 See Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/advoverview.htm [https://perma.cc/8PEW-2PL9] (last modified Nov. 23, 
2010) (outlining the fiduciary duty of investment advisers under current law). 
 103 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c). 
 104 See Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, supra note 102 (summarizing 
the compliance requirements for registered advisers). 
 105 See generally Andrew W. Lo, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2007) (dis-
cussing the empirical research related to the efficient market hypothesis, which is admittedly in-
conclusive in certain respects). 
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liquid instruments. The SEC, however, has consistently reiterated that these 
provisions are designed to protect investors.106 
Although Congress acknowledged that the investment fund industry was 
closely tied to the national public interest in the 1940 Act, the tailored regula-
tion was not specifically intended to mitigate systemic risk. This elusive term 
has yet to be defined by regulators, but it broadly refers to scenarios where 
the failure of a single financial institution could lead to a series of correlated 
defaults that serve to cripple the broader economy.107 Institutions that fall into 
this category are commonly known as being “too big to fail.” Although the 
failure of a particular fund could admittedly lead to massive investor losses, 
these entities were not historically viewed by regulators as being systemically 
harmful. Investors could previously absorb any losses associated with an in-
vestment fund failure and the fund’s demise would not lead to correlated de-
faults of other funds or financial institutions. 
In contrast, banking institutions were historically deemed as posing a sys-
temic threat to the broader economy.108 The failure of a single bank could lead 
to simultaneous bank-runs and other financial calamities the likes of which 
rippled through the global economy during the Great Depression.109 Banks are 
consequently subject to a more robust system of regulation that extends be-
yond the transparency framework under the federal securities laws.110 These 
rules are commonly referred to as prudential regulation and they are specifical-
ly tailored to mitigate systemic risk by controlling the extent to which banks 
can extend capital to third parties. Prudential regulation thus mandates capital 
and reserve requirements, and includes governance mandates and detailed li-
censing standards to reduce the likelihood of a bank failure.111 Banks are also 
overseen by a different group of regulators such as the Federal Reserve, and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).112 This reflects a clear 
dividing line between investor protection and systemic risk from a regulatory 
perspective.113 Regulations previously made distinctions amongst the catego-
                                                                                                                           
 106 Laws That Govern, supra note 84. The SEC specifically states on its website, “The focus 
of [the 1940 Act] is on disclosure to the investing public of information about the fund and its 
investment objectives, as well as on investment company structure and operations.” Id. 
 107 See infra notes 135–140 and accompanying text (identifying prominent definitions of 
systemic risk proposed by regulators and scholars). 
 108 Dombalagian, supra note 2, at 797. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Regulations, supra note 3. 
 111 See MALLOY, supra note 4, § 1.9; see also Hu, supra note 4, at 568–69 (describing various 
disclosure mandates that are generally applicable to banks). 
 112 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 17, at 719 (listing the federal regulators of banks). 
 113 See Paredes, supra note 45, at 990 (“[T]he SEC has never principally been concerned with 
the kinds of systemic risks that hedge fund collapses pose. Systemic risk is a matter for other regu-
lators such as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department.”). 
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ries of entities that created systemic risk, the administrative agencies charged 
with regulating systemic risk, and the regulatory tools used to mitigate system-
ic risk. 
Yet as will be further discussed in Part II below, the emergence of sys-
temic risk in the asset management industry has skewed the application of 
these traditional divisions. Numerous financial innovations have blurred the 
distinction between banking institutions and investment funds. Certain in-
vestment funds that are private in nature can now fall into the “too big to fail” 
category and their pervasive participation in the capital markets as increased 
their interconnectedness with a variety of financial intermediaries. 
II. BLURRED DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE FUNDS AND BANKS 
Financial innovation has blurred the distinction between private funds 
and banking entities, challenging the regulatory division between systemic 
risk and investor protection. Part II begins by explaining how the flexibilities 
granted to hedge funds under a web of exemptions created scenarios where 
these entities could become “too big to fail” and become heavily intercon-
nected with other intermediaries.114 It proceeds by evaluating Congress’ re-
sponse to this regulatory conundrum.115 FSOC was created under the Dodd-
Frank Act to identify hedge funds that are systemically harmful.116 Any such 
funds would then be subject to the regulatory constraints that are imposed 
upon banks.117 Part II concludes by describing FSOC’s failure to identify a 
hedge fund as a SIFI, thereby creating a hedge fund loophole.118 
A. Hedge Fund Strategies Create Systemic Risk Concerns 
1. Prevalence of Hedge Fund Industry 
Because investment fund laws were structured to protect investors, elite 
investors such as wealthy individuals and institutional investors were made 
free to invest in riskier strategies.119 These investors were deemed by courts 
and by regulators as having the resources to sufficiently protect themselves 
without the need for federal safeguards.120 Thus investment funds that were 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See infra notes 119–164 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 165–225 and accompanying text. 
 116 See infra notes 185–210 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 185–210 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 226–269 and accompanying text. 
 119 See infra note 121 (defining “elite investors”). 
 120 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012) (clarifying that the Securities Act only applies to “pub-
lic” offerings); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that offerings that 
are restricted to investors who can “fend for themselves” are private in nature); 17 C.F.R. 
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exclusively offered to such elite investors121 were deemed private and were 
exempt from the arduous transparency, governance and access restrictions 
that would otherwise be mandated under the federal securities laws.122 Due to 
these exemptions, these private funds were often characterized by popular 
media as being opaque and highly exclusive.123 Common categories of pri-
vate funds include hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital 
funds. 
With respect to the hedge fund industry, it is extremely heterogeneous as 
entities employ a multitude of strategies such as market neutral, global macro, 
opportunistic, emerging markets, and distressed securities, to name a few.124 
In contrast, registered funds, such as mutual funds and money-market funds, 
are quite constrained in terms of available investment opportunities due to the 
“access” limitations discussed in Part II.B.125 Many registered funds focus 
their strategies on equities, bonds, and cash instruments.126 In terms of guar-
anteeing absolute returns, the flexibilities afforded to hedge funds also allow 
                                                                                                                           
§ 230.501(a) (2016) (defining “accredited investors” as individuals with certain income thresholds 
or a high net worth requirements, or a variety of institutions that have been specified under this 
provision); Letter of General Counsel Discussing Factors to be Considered in Determining Avail-
ability of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securi-
ties Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10952 (Jan. 24, 1935) (specifying that the SEC will con-
sider the relationship of offerees to the issuer in determining whether an offering is public). 
 121 For purposes of this Article, “elite” investors can include “accredited investors,” “qualified 
purchasers,” or any other category of investors that have been identified under the federal securi-
ties laws as having the resources to appropriately fend for themselves. Accredited investors in-
clude “any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, 
exceeds $1,000,000” as well as a long list of institutions. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). Qualified pur-
chasers include family owned companies that own at least $5,000,000 in investments as well as 
natural persons who own at least $5,000,000 in investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i)–(ii) 
(2012). 
 122 If investment funds restrict investors to “qualified purchasers” then they are exempt from 
the leverage restrictions and other registration requirements promulgated under the 1940 Act. 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). Funds can also bypass these arduous requirements if they restrict the number 
of investors to 100 beneficial owners, and each such owner qualifies as an accredited investor. Id. 
§ 80a-3(c)(1). 
 123 See, e.g., Chris Arnade, Hedge Funds: The Mysterious Power Pulling Strings on Wall 
Street, The GUARDIAN (June 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/jun/01/hedge-
funds-power-wall-street-pulling-strings [https://perma.cc/GX66-3AG8] (“Hedge funds, to the 
regular citizen, seem shadowy and strange. Super secretive, absurdly paid, massive investment 
firms that manage, in total, close to $2.2tn.”); John Cassidy, The Great Hedge-Fund Mystery: Why 
Do They Make So Much?, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-
cassidy/the-great-hedge-fund-mystery-why-do-they-make-so-much [https://perma.cc/G5T4-TRGN] 
(highlighting that “[t]he hedge-fund industry is famously secretive”). 
 124 See Dion Friedland, Synopsis of Hedge Fund Strategies, MAGNUM FUNDS (Mar. 11, 2017), 
http://www.magnum.com/hedgefunds/strategies.asp [https://perma.cc/Y6AH-UADM] (detailing a 
number of different types of hedge fund strategies). 
 125 See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text (discussing “access” limitations). 
 126 SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 4 (2010). 
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them to employ protective strategies in declining markets.127 For example, 
hedge fund adviser can liberally rely on short-trading to earn returns on in-
vestments that are declining in value.128 These freedoms could have been a 
contributing factor in the hedge fund industry outperforming the mutual fund 
industry during the Great Recession.129 
Because of the flexibilities afforded to hedge funds, the industry has 
grown rapidly in recent decades.130 Institutional investors such as pension 
plans, insurance companies, and endowments are increasingly relying on 
these vehicles to manage risk and earn returns.131 With their abilities to pur-
sue the most innovative strategies, hedge funds are often considered a highly 
valuable component to investment portfolios.132 Some estimates have found 
that hedge fund advisers currently manage over $3 trillion in the United 
States.133 Others have predicted that the industry will grow to over $5 trillion 
by the end of 2018.134 
2. Hedge Funds Can Become “Too Big to Fail” 
In the midst of this massive growth however, various studies revealed 
that hedge funds could create and transmit systemic risk given their respec-
tive freedoms to trade in derivatives and carry unlimited leverage.135 The 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE 
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 130 See Cary Martin Shelby, Privileged Access to Financial Innovation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
315, 326 (2015) (elaborating on the growth of the hedge fund industry). 
 131 See id. at 346–60 (providing broad overview of strategies and instruments that are simply 
unavailable to registered funds due to the 1940 Act restrictions). 
 132 Id. at 326. 
 133 EVESTMENT, HEDGE FUND AUM AT $3.13T AS ALLOCATIONS CONTINUE (2015), availa-
ble at https://www.evestment.com/resources/research-reports/2015-research-reports/global-hedge-
fund-asset-flows-report—april-2015. 
 134 See Halah Touryalai, Everybody Loves Hedge Funds, Assets Hit Record $3 Trillion, FORBES 
(June 25, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2014/06/25/everybody-loves-
hedge-funds-assets-hit-record-3-trillion [http://web.archive.org/web/20160213120442/http://www.
forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2014/06/25/everybody-loves-hedge-funds-assets-hit-record-3-
trillion/#6fe0625c3fc8] (citing a Citigroup report that makes such a prediction). 
 135 See infra notes 144–153 and accompanying text (discussing various studies that have ex-
plored the threat of systemic risk generated by hedge funds). 
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original exemptions from regulation did not sufficiently anticipate that certain 
hedge fund strategies could have a spillover effect onto the general public. As 
briefly discussed above, systemic risk has not yet been defined by regulators. 
It vaguely refers to the risk that an institution’s failure could lead to a se-
quence of calamities that debilitate the broader economy. Former Chair Mary 
Jo White of the SEC similarly referenced systemic risk as, “the likelihood that 
an entity’s failure will cause a cascading failure across the financial system as 
a whole.”136 Early banking laws relied on similar notions of systemic risk, as 
the legislation was largely designed to prevent bank-runs, where market pan-
ics would cause consumers to simultaneously demand their deposits from 
multiple banks at a time.137 
In applying these basic notions of systemic risk to the private fund in-
dustry, highly leveraged hedge funds could create systemic risk by exposing 
its banking counterparties to corresponding risks of failure. This was evi-
denced by the near failure of LTCM in 1998.138 LTCM was so heavily lever-
aged that it was set to default on over $1 trillion of contracts with its invest-
ment banking counterparties.139 This private entity essentially fell into the 
“too big to fail” category of financial institutions. The Federal Reserve was 
then forced to orchestrate a deal amongst these banks to prevent an economic 
collapse of epic proportions.140 This single event signaled to the regulators 
that in spite of the limited investor protection risks created by hedge funds, 
they could still have a profound and lasting impact on the global economy. 
3. Other Categories of Systemic Risk 
In light of the recent financial crisis, scholars have attempted to expand 
notions of systemic risk to encompass a wider range of institutions and mar-
ket activities. Professor Andrew Lo, for instance, has proposed that systemic 
risk “captures the linkages and vulnerabilities of the entire financial system, 
not just those of the banking system.”141 In measuring systemic risk, Profes-
sor Lo suggests evaluating a variety of factors such as “leverage, liquidity, 
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correlation, concentration, sensitivities, and connectedness.”142 Professor Ste-
ven Schwarcz likewise advocates for a more expansive definition that inte-
grates both institutional and market systemic risk. He proposes that systemic 
risk be defined as:  
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional 
failure triggers (through panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of 
a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant loss-
es to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of 
capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substan-
tial financial-market volatility.143 
In applying these more expansive definitions, hedge funds that are not 
“too big to fail” could still create systemic risk through their interconnected-
ness with other financial institutions, their trading patterns, their sensitivities 
to market volatility, and through several other categories of activities. In 
2007, Professors Lo and Amir E. Khandani published a case study that inves-
tigated the mysterious losses experienced by long/short equity hedge funds, 
which occurred in spite of stable prices within related equity and fixed-
income markets.144 The results of their study supported their hypothesis that: 
[T]he initial losses . . . were due to the forced liquidation of one or 
more large equity market-neutral portfolios, primarily to raise cash 
or reduce leverage, and the subsequent price impact of this massive 
and sudden unwinding caused other similarly constructed portfoli-
os to experience losses. These losses, in turn, caused other funds to 
deleverage their portfolios, yielding additional price impact that led 
to further losses, more deleveraging, and so on.145 
They further concluded that the losses experienced by these funds “provides 
the first piece of evidence that problems in one corner of the financial sys-
tem—possibly the sub-prime mortgage sector and related credit markets—
can spill over so directly to a completely unrelated corner: long/short equity 
strategies.”146 As such, hedge funds have grown so interconnected that the 
collective losses of one subset of hedge funds can cascade into a completely 
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 143 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
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unrelated sector of strategies. Moreover, to the extent that there are multiple 
fund failures that result from heightened interconnectedness, hedge fund 
counterparties could be exposed to corresponding losses. Systemic risk can 
therefore be created by a large number of smaller hedge funds that are closely 
interconnected to other hedge funds and to other financial intermediaries. 
During the financial crisis, hedge funds also engaged in trading patterns 
that arguably transmitted systemic risk to investment banks, insurance com-
panies, and commercial banks. Large scale redemption requests from inves-
tors forced hedge fund advisers to liquidate their underlying equity positions 
at fire-sale prices.147 Some have estimated that “one in four hedge funds sold 
more than 40 percent of its equity portfolio, and the hedge fund industry liq-
uidated about 30 percent of its stock holdings.”148 Also, because hedge funds 
control a large portion of the trading activities on the public capital markets, 
these massive liquidations had a spill-over effect on other financial interme-
diaries.149 As one source noted, “[w]hen a hedge fund must suddenly sell bil-
lions in assets to cover a loan or a margin call, it can set off a damaging chain 
reaction.”150 An Economic Letter published by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco similarly found that “[t]he sale of those assets increases the 
supply on the market, which drives prices lower, especially when market li-
quidity is low. This in turn leads to more margin calls on other financial insti-
tutions, creating a downward spiral.”151 This study concluded that “hedge 
funds may be the most important transmitters of shocks during crises, more 
important than commercial banks or investment banks.”152 The collective 
impact that hedge funds can have on asset prices is heightened by the increas-
ing connectedness of the industry. 
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 149 A recent study found that: 
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Another report found that hedge funds facilitated a “bank run” on their 
prime brokerage counterparties in 2008.153 When Lehman Brothers Holdings 
failed in 2008, hedge fund advisers demanded tens of billions of dollars from 
other investment banks that held large sums of the industry’s capital.154 Given 
the interconnectedness of the financial sector, hedge fund advisers rightfully 
feared that other banks would declare bankruptcy. This would in-turn freeze 
the assets of such banks’ underlying counterparties. As such, hedge fund ad-
visers were indeed justified in withdrawing their fund assets from these trou-
bled financial institutions. These simultaneous withdrawals, however, sig-
naled a systemic risk event that mirrored the bank-runs by depositors that ex-
acerbated the Great Depression.155 
Hedge funds have been identified by some commentators as being an in-
tegral component to the shadow banking industry,156 which refers to a net-
work of “financial intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of credit 
across the global financial system but whose members are not subject to regu-
latory oversight.”157 Credit was traditionally created and managed exclusively 
by large banking institutions that were subject to prudential regulation to pro-
tect the general public against systemic shocks. Prior to the 2008 crisis, inno-
vative financial instruments such as credit default obligations (“CDOs”) and 
credit default swaps (“CDS”), allowed hedge funds to directly participate in 
these credit markets without facing the stringent regulation provided under 
traditional banking laws.158 Hedge funds purchased and sold a sizable per-
centage of the complex derivatives that were closely intertwined with toxic 
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debt.159 Some have estimated that in 2006, hedge funds controlled up to fifty-
eight percent of the credit derivative markets.160 
Simply trading in these toxic instruments would not automatically trig-
ger a systemic risk event. In fact, many commentators have critiqued the new 
regulation of hedge funds under Dodd-Frank because the banking industry 
predominantly created and sold the complex derivatives that exploited sub-
prime mortgages.161 Many commentators, however, have also argued that 
hedge funds similarly increased systemic risk by contributing to the burgeon-
ing subprime mortgage bubble. Professor Photis Lysandrou concluded that in 
spite of hedge funds playing a limited role in constructing subprime mortgage 
instruments: 
[H]ad it not been for the hedge funds’ intermediary position be-
tween the investors seeking yield on the one hand and the banks 
that created the high yielding securities on the other, the supply of 
these securities would never have reached the proportions that were 
critical in precipitating the near collapse of the whole financial sys-
tem. There should not have been a mass market for the subprime-
backed securities given that their complex and opaque structure 
broke all the rules of commodity exchange, and without the hedge 
funds such a market would not in fact have existed.162 
As reflected by this quote, these private entities provided a significant amount 
of liquidity with respect to CDS, CDOs and other the toxic derivatives that 
were intertwined with subprime mortgages.163 They were often the parties 
that were transacting directly with banks in purchasing these instruments on a 
massive scale. In some cases, hedge fund advisers may have even resuscitated 
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the demand for such instruments when the subprime mortgage bubble showed 
signs of deflating.164 
In summary, the federal securities laws did not anticipate the degree 
through which hedge funds could create and transmit systemic risk. A single 
hedge fund can create a systemic risk event if it is so highly leveraged that it 
becomes “too big to fail,” exposing its banking counterparties to significant 
losses. Moreover, a series of smaller funds can create and transmit systemic 
risk given the industry’s significant participation in various sectors of the fi-
nancial markets. If a group of interconnected funds simultaneously sells as-
sets in order to fund redemption requests and/or margin calls, such assets 
classes can experience significant price declines. Hedge funds can also con-
tribute to the inflation of a toxic bubble given their unfettered access to deriv-
ative markets. Financial innovation has made it easier for this private industry 
to participate in the creation and transmission of credit, which further calls 
into questions whether the industry should be subject to regulation that is 
comparable to banks. 
B. Systemic Risk Authority Granted to FSOC 
1. Academic Discourse Regarding Administrative Authority 
In response to these systemic risk harms, academics have long debated 
the need for systemic risk regulation over the hedge fund industry. Some are 
skeptical as to the need for such regulation and they have argued that the 
near-failure of LTCM was the last scenario of a hedge fund becoming too big 
to fail.165 Industry stakeholders have argued that although other large funds 
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have since failed, investors have been able to fully absorb such losses without 
exposing the broader economy to cascading harms.166 In contrast, other 
scholars are still concerned with the growing interconnectedness of the indus-
try with multiple facets of the financial markets. Professor Lo summarized 
this issue as follows: 
[Hedge] funds have become central to the global financial system, 
providing loans, liquidity, insurance, risk-sharing, and other im-
portance services that used to be the exclusive domain of banks. But 
unlike banks—which are highly regulated entities . . . with specific 
capital adequacy requirements and leverage and risk constraints—
hedge funds and their investors are relatively unconstrained.167 
Some recent empirical studies have similarly concluded that the increasing 
interconnectedness of the hedge fund industry could expose the broader 
economy to systemic harms.168 
Even if scholars agree on the need to regulate systemic risk in the indus-
try, there is still considerable disagreement over the appropriate form of regu-
lation. Resolving this question is particularly challenging given the fragment-
ed nature of the regulatory system.169 With respect to the federal securities 
laws, the SEC holds primary responsibility for regulating the securities indus-
try and protecting investors, while the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (“CFTC”) regulates commodity futures markets and the bulk of OTC 
derivatives.170 As a result, many investment vehicles which trade in both the 
securities and commodities markets, have to either separately register with or 
obtain exemptions from the SEC and the CFTC.171 These agencies further 
delegate certain regulatory functions to self-regulatory organizations such as 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)172 and the National 
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Futures Association (“NFA”),173 which create additional registration require-
ments for industry participants. With respect to the banking industry, the 
FDIC174 and the Federal Reserve175 are the administrative bodies charged 
with monitoring the banking system and monetary policies. The Federal Re-
serve must frequently work with the Department of the Treasury in ensuring 
the nation’s financial stability.176 
Selecting the appropriate administrative body to oversee systemically 
harmful hedge funds amongst this panoply of options is subject to significant 
debate and controversy. The SEC attempted to assert jurisdiction over the 
industry in 2004 with the passage of the now defunct Hedge Fund Rule which 
required certain hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act.177 In 
2006, in Goldstein v. SEC, the DC Circuit notably ruled that the agency over-
stepped its administrative authority in adopting the Hedge Fund Rule, and it 
implicitly instructed Congress to undertake the task of regulating the indus-
try.178 Professors John C. Coffee and Hillary Sale have expressed concerns 
with simply extending the SEC’s authority in this regard. In particular, they 
have identified the SEC’s failure in implementing net-capital requirements 
over broker-dealers and suggested that systemically harmful hedge funds be 
subject to a degree of prudential regulation that would extend beyond the 
SEC investor protection mandate.179 They have specifically suggested that 
“the Federal Reserve [be granted] authority to monitor and restrict the lever-
age of all financial institutions that are ‘too big to fail.’”180 They reasoned that 
“banking regulators have the natural comparative advantage in this area. Cap-
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ital adequacy regulation, including the supervision of risk management, is the 
core business of banking regulators.”181 
Other scholars have emphasized the need for consolidation of regulatory 
agencies because systemic risk can be transmitted through a variety of chan-
nels and financial instruments.182 Merging the CFTC and SEC could ensure 
more efficient oversight over systemically harmful strategies that may rely on 
a complex interplay of securities, futures, and OTC derivatives.183 Another 
popular solution proposed by researchers in this area is to create yet an addi-
tional administrative body to oversee all systemically harmful financial insti-
tutions.184 This “super-regulator” would use information collected from exist-
ing administrative agencies to regulate institutions that are deemed systemi-
cally harmful. 
2. SIFI Designation Process for Nonbank Entities 
Congress finally reconciled this debate with the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, which created a new regulatory framework for hedge funds. It first 
reinstated the SEC’s previous Hedge Fund Rule by requiring many hedge 
fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act.185 This law is yet another 
tool for the SEC to utilize in effectuating its investor protection mission and 
would thus have a limited impact on mitigating systemic risk.186 For the sake 
of clarity, the Advisers Act does not include specific restrictions on leverage 
or derivatives trading. Its mandated disclosures are very limited in compari-
son to those required under the 1940 Act and the Securities Act. These laws 
would require more detailed disclosures with respect to the underlying fund 
such as total leverage, specific strategy descriptions, audited financial state-
ments, and several other categories of information. 
In regulating systemically harmful hedge funds, the Dodd-Frank Act 
granted authority to a newly created administrative agency called FSOC.187 
FSOC is comprised of ten voting members and five nonvoting members from 
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various administrative bodies.188 Voting members include Chairpersons of the 
SEC, CFTC, and the Federal Reserve.189 Nonvoting members include state 
regulators such as a state insurance commissioner, banking supervisor, and 
securities commissioner.190 FSOC’s authority extends to “identifying risks to 
the financial stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and 
responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United States’ financial 
system.”191 As previously noted, FSOC also has the power to designate both 
“bank entities” and “nonbank entities,” such as hedge funds for example, as 
“systemically important financial institutions,”192 which would cause such 
entities to be subject to a degree of prudential regulation.193 
FSOC has since developed a comprehensive three-stage review process 
for determining whether nonbank entities should be designated as SIFIs.194 
Stage 1 is essentially designed to narrow the universe of entities that will be 
subject to more detailed evaluation under subsequent stages.195 Entities that 
meet specific quantitative thresholds during this stage are subject to addition-
al evaluation by FSOC in Stage 2. In order to surpass this stage, entities must 
first have at least $50 billion in total consolidated assets.196 Entities that fall 
into this category must then surpass at least one additional threshold related to 
gross national credit, total derivatives liability, and other quantitative thresh-
olds that are mostly related to leverage.197 Thus, hedge funds that have less 
than $50 billion in total consolidated assets will never be subject to a SIFI 
designation. 
If a nonbank entity exceeds the Stage 1 thresholds, it will then be subject 
to further evaluation under Stage 2. At this stage, FSOC analyzes the follow-
ing six characteristics with respect to the nonbank entity: “size, interconnect-
edness, substitutability, leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and 
existing regulatory scrutiny.”198 FSOC interpretive guidance provides possi-
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ble metrics for each of these factors. For instance, interconnectedness “cap-
tures direct or indirect linkages between financial companies that may be 
conduits for the transmission of the effects resulting from a nonbank financial 
company’s material financial distress or activities.”199 This could be measured 
by reviewing “[c]ounterparties’ exposures to a nonbank financial compa-
ny”200 or “[n]umber, size, and financial strength of a nonbank financial com-
pany’s counterparties.”201 FSOC uses these characteristics to determine 
whether a nonbank entity is vulnerable to financial distress, and whether an 
entity’s financial distress would adversely impact the broader economy. 
The SEC assists FSOC in collecting pertinent information from hedge 
fund advisers in applying this six-category framework. This information is 
collected via a newly created Form PF, which further requires that hedge fund 
advisers report proprietary information to the SEC on a confidential basis.202 
Reported information can include a description of its assets under manage-
ment, use of leverage, counterparty credit exposure, trading and investment 
positions, valuation policies and practices, types of assets held, and “such 
other information as the Commission . . . determines is necessary and appro-
priate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the as-
sessment of systemic risk.”203 All hedge fund advisers that are required to 
register under the Advisers Act must also complete some variation of this 
Form PF.204 
Once a nonbank entity surpasses Stage 2 review, it is then subject to ad-
ditional evaluation by FSOC during Stage 3.205 If a nonbank entity enters into 
Stage 3, FSOC notifies such entity that it is being evaluated for a possible 
SIFI designation.206 FSOC then undergoes a more detailed analysis of the 
above six-factors and can then request additional information from the prima-
ry regulator or directly from the nonbank entity. At this stage, FSOC is largely 
assessing any factors that “could mitigate or aggravate the potential of the 
nonbank financial company to pose a threat to the United States.”207 
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If a SIFI designation is made during Stage 3, the nonbank entity can re-
quest a hearing contesting this finding.208 FSOC then discloses any final SIFI 
designations to the general public. FSOC, however, refrains from disclosing 
its detailed analyses that occur during the three stages preceding a SIFI desig-
nation.209 As briefly discussed above, a SIFI designation can be extremely 
disruptive as it exposes the underlying entity to enhanced prudential regula-
tion by the Federal Reserve. Applying prudential regulation to a hedge fund 
could make it difficult, if not impossible, for the adviser to employ its under-
ling strategy. Should a SIFI fail, it would also enter into a receivership pro-
cess that would be administered and supervised by the FDIC.210 
3. Predicted Shortcomings 
Proponents of the SIFI designation process for nonbank entities have ar-
gued that it is the ideal mechanism for reducing the unique categories of sys-
temic risk created by these entities. They have largely reasoned that highly 
leveraged entities that are creating negative externalities, similar to those cre-
ated by banks, should be subject to comparable regulation.211 Many have fur-
ther hypothesized that the prudential standards that would result from a SIFI 
designation could serve as a “best practices” model for the respective indus-
try.212 This could in turn incentivize other institutions to adopt comparable 
standards.213 A SIFI designation could even benefit the underlying fund be-
cause counterparties would be more willing to transact with firms that follow 
prudential standards.214 Investors may be more willing to invest in such funds 
given the additional layers of protection provided by prudential regulation. 
Even still, the critics of the SIFI designation process have gained more 
traction given the difficulties that FSOC has encountered in designating an 
asset manager as a SIFI, which will be further discussed in Part II.C. below. 
With respect to registered funds, they are already subject to layers of regula-
                                                                                                                           
 208 Id. 
 209 See id. (stating that “[t]he Council does not intend to publicly announce the name of any 
nonbank financial company that is under evaluation for a determination prior to a final determina-
tion with respect to such company”). 
 210 Winkler, supra note 22. 
 211 See, e.g., David Schneider, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and 
Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 261, 307 (advocating that lever-
age limits be imposed upon hedge funds); see also Matussek, supra note 14 (noting the view of 
some European regulators that hedge funds can carry the same degree of risk as banks). 
 212 See, e.g., Gregory S. Rowland, Designation of Asset Managers and Funds as Systemically 
Important Non-Bank Financial Institutions, INVESTMENT LAW., Apr. 2013, at 1, 5. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
672 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:639 
tion under the federal securities laws.215 Although these laws were originally 
designed to enhance investor protection, they can be used to mitigate system-
ic risk as will be analyzed in Part III of this Article. In regards to private 
funds, the hedge fund industry has been vehemently opposed to the use of 
prudential regulation as a means to mitigate systemic risk because the costs of 
doing so could be detrimental to the operations of the fund. As one source 
noted: 
The cost implications of being designated a SIFI could be ruinous 
for some firms. Unlike banks, hedge funds simply do not have the 
financial resources or infrastructure to handle the subsequent regu-
latory requirements they would be expected to adhere to. SIFIs 
could be forced to hold more capital, impose basic liquidity risk 
management standards, limits on liquidity risk, stress testing, living 
wills and limits on single counterparty credit exposures.216 
As asserted by this quote, if a hedge fund were designated as a SIFI and 
therefore subject to prudential regulation, it could destroy its ability to pursue 
its underlying strategy. Imposing this degree of regulation could in turn ham-
per the returns of hedge fund investors. This can become problematic if the 
benefits of imposing such regulation fail to exceed its extensive costs. With 
the potentially destructive costs of complying with prudential regulation, 
there is a high likelihood that a hedge fund identified as a SIFI would sue 
FSOC for an arbitrary and capricious designation.217 This looming threat of 
litigation has likely stifled FSOC’s ability to designate a hedge fund as a SIFI. 
In terms of assessing the benefits of prudential regulation, commentators 
have questioned the degree to which the SIFI model can actually reduce the 
unique categories of systemic risk created by the hedge fund industry. As dis-
cussed above, hedge funds must first have at least $50 billion in total consoli-
dated assets in order to be classified as a SIFI. Although this threshold may 
indeed capture funds that are deemed “too big to fail,” it will not capture 
smaller funds that are heavily interconnected with other financial intermediar-
ies. As one source noted, “[although] reforms focus on the operations of the 
largest hedge funds . . . . recent research has pointed to risks created by large 
numbers of small or medium-sized hedge funds that pursue similar strate-
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gies.”218 Moreover, the empirical studies in this area have largely found that 
interconnectedness is the preeminent area of concern in terms of mitigating 
systemic risk as the near failure of LTCM was arguably the last instance of a 
fund becoming “too big to fail.”219 
Other sources have similarly questioned whether the SIFI designation 
process can appropriately capture the growing complexities of the financial 
markets. Michael Cappucci, who is currently the Senior Vice President at 
Harvard Management Company, identified FSOC’s potential shortcomings, 
stating that “[u]nder conditions of true complexity where unpredictability 
reigns, the knowledge required to fully understand—never mind forecast and 
effectively influence—a system exceeds that of any single person or group as 
august as one that comprises the FSOC.”220 He further noted that the best way 
to address the complexities of the markets that have created the unique cate-
gories of systemic risk discussed herein, is to improve overall market effi-
ciency, as opposed to imposing prophylactic rules.221 More specifically he 
stated, “The way to improve the functioning of the market through regulator 
proof rules is to pursue policies that promote market efficiency, with features 
like transparency, liquidity, and predictability; and discourage or eliminate the 
obstacles of market efficiency, like opacity, exogenous shocks, and unpredict-
ability.”222 As will be further discussed in Part III, creating a regulatory 
framework under the federal securities laws may be the best mechanism for 
improving market efficiency and thereby reducing systemic risk with respect 
to the asset management industry. 
Prudential regulation has also been frequently categorized by commen-
tators as a poor fit for the nuances and intricacies of the asset management 
industry.223 In applying this framework to investment funds, the Federal Re-
serve would invariably have to consult with the SEC, and other regulatory 
agencies, on how to do so. There is a risk, however, that “the Fed will give 
insufficient deference to the extensive experience and knowledge residing 
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with the existing regulators.”224 To the extent that the Federal Reserve fails to 
appropriately consult with regulators in this regard, this could increase the 
regulatory complexity that currently applies to the asset management industry. 
The creation of FSOC seems to have extended and complicated the patchwork 
of regulation that applies to the industry and it further fragments the regulatory 
structure. This growing phenomenon inevitably produces ineffective and re-
dundant regulation.225 By and large, these critiques served as a forewarning to 
FSOC’s inability to apply the SIFI framework to investment funds. 
C. Hedge Fund Loophole 
1. FSOC Fails to Designate a Hedge Fund as a SIFI 
Since adopting the detailed SIFI designation process for nonbank enti-
ties, FSOC has encountered numerous challenges in attempting to identify a 
hedge fund as a SIFI. These challenges relate to deficiencies in the systemic 
risk data collected by the SEC, criticisms to systemic risk studies sanctioned 
by FSOC, and massive resistance to the SIFI designation process by numer-
ous industry participants. For instance, FSOC instructed the Treasury De-
partment’s Office of Financial Research (“OFR”) to prepare a study to inves-
tigate whether the asset management industry contributed to systemic risk.226 
The final report was published in September 2013 and it did in fact find that 
investment funds could create systemic risk through a wide range of activities 
such as the increasing use of leverage, and the risk of facing excessive re-
demption requests during times of financial distress.227 
This OFR study, however, was severely criticized by a large number of 
industry participants, particularly because the study seemed to focus on regis-
tered funds that are already subject to layers of regulation under the federal 
securities laws.228 These laws include stringent restrictions on leverage, as 
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well as requirements that managers maintain a high percentage of liquid as-
sets in order to fund frequent redemption requests.229 Many commenters simi-
larly found that the study had no empirical basis for deeming these laws in-
sufficient in managing the emerging systemic risk concerns identified by this 
report.230 Other commenters observed that the study did not appropriately 
distinguish amongst categories of fund strategies, each of which could poten-
tially produce varying degrees of systemic risk concerns.231 This fervent op-
position also found support from the SEC community, as SEC Commissioner 
Donald M. Gallagher stated that the “OFR Report completely failed to pro-
vide a legitimate rationale for systemic risk designation.”232 He further 
warned that “[the report’s] myriad inaccuracies and unsupported conclusions 
would make excellent fodder for the litigation that would be sure to follow 
any decision to designate asset managers as SIFIs.”233 
Due to the deficiencies in the OFR report, as well as the rampant opposi-
tion repeatedly expressed by industry participants, FSOC announced during a 
meeting in July 2014 that it would “undertake a more focused analysis” of 
how the products and activities of the asset management industry as a whole 
contribute to systemic risk.234 In effectuating this task, FSOC published a 
study in April 2016 entitled, Update on Review of Asset Management Prod-
ucts and Activities (“FSOC Report”).235 The FSOC Report made clear distinc-
tions amongst various categories of asset managers. It then provided a more 
thorough analysis of how each category could contribute to systemic risk. 
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With respect to registered funds, the FSOC Report acknowledged that 
certain classes of mutual funds have increased their use of leverage in recent 
years.236 Alternative asset mutual funds, which heavily rely on derivatives to 
chase returns, have also grown in popularity.237 FSOC, however, seemed to 
approve of the SEC’s recent proposals to strengthen the capital restrictions 
and liquidity constraints provided under the 1940 Act as a means of address-
ing these systemic risk concerns.238 So although the 1940 Act was originally 
designed to enhance investor protection, this is perhaps an implicit approval 
by FSOC to use this legislation as a means to mitigate systemic risk for regis-
tered funds. Moreover, proposing these rules was perhaps a strategic move by 
the SEC to prevent FSOC from designating a registered fund as a SIFI. Alt-
hough FSOC could still presumably do so, it is highly unlikely particularly if 
the reforms proposed by the SEC are eventually adopted. 
In regards to the hedge fund industry, the FSOC Report examined data 
retrieved from Form PF filings to examine the extent to which hedge funds 
are excessively leveraged.239 Although it concluded that a potentially trou-
bling degree of leverage is concentrated amongst a small group of larger 
hedge funds, it identified several deficiencies in the systemic risk data col-
lected via the Form PF. The report specifically found that the “Form PF does 
not provide complete information on the economics and corresponding risk 
exposures of hedge fund leverage or potential mitigates associated with re-
ported leverage levels.”240 The report further noted the limitations of the ex-
isting regulatory reforms in protecting against future financial crises. For ex-
ample, the new clearing requirement for certain OTC derivatives does not 
equally apply to all financial instruments, and it has not been sufficiently test-
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ed under varying market conditions.241 FSOC also queried whether counter-
parties can fully assess the risks of transacting with hedge funds given the 
complexity of their strategies.242 Due to these limitations, FSOC formed an 
interagency group to address the potential gaps in information, and to asses 
an optimal form of regulation for systemically harmful funds.243  
FSOC published a report in November 2016 which documented the pro-
gress of this interagency group.244 It similarly found that hedge funds can cre-
ate and transmit systemic risk “(1) by causing or contributing to significant 
disruptions of key financial markets through forced selling, or (2) by trans-
mitting stress to counterparties that are large, highly interconnected financial 
institutions.”245 This report also identified the ongoing data limitations that 
prevent the interagency working group from assessing the true impact that 
hedge funds have on the markets. It specifically stated, “It is difficult to use 
certain existing regulatory data sources because reporting is not standardized 
across financial market utilities and regulatory agencies.”246    
These transparency deficits are not likely to be resolved in the near fu-
ture given recent initiatives to reduce regulation over private markets. More 
specifically, the new administration has introduced several deregulatory ini-
tiatives designed to repeal major portions of the Dodd-Frank Act247 and the 
newly appointed chairperson of FSOC is Steven Terner Mnuchin who has 
deep connections to the hedge fund industry.248 Lee Reiners, the director of 
Duke University’s Global Financial Markets Center, recently predicted that 
this appointment could lead to “severe” consequences, because it would like-
ly cause the FSOC’s research on the systemic risk threats posed by hedge 
funds to be “put on ice.”249 Although it is not yet clear how FSOC’s power 
will be impacted by these possible reforms, the deeply politicized nature of 
FSOC’s leadership will likely prevent the council from focusing on hedge 
funds. 
In the meantime, the SEC cannot unilaterally act to regulate hedge funds 
in the same manner that it did with respect to registered funds. Because hedge 
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funds are exempt from the transparency mandates provided under the 1940 
Act, the agency would need specific authority granted from Congress in order 
to create tailored disclosures. In addition, FSOC is highly unlikely to desig-
nate a hedge fund as a SIFI because of the heightened litigation risk associat-
ed with doing so. This litigation risk arises from the power of nonbank enti-
ties to request judicial review of a SIFI designation if the courts determine 
that FSOC acted in a way that is “arbitrary and capricious.”250 Industry partic-
ipants initially viewed this standard as being an insurmountable hurdle for 
potential litigants. In 2016, however, in MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held 
that MetLife’s SIFI designation was arbitrary and capricious.251 It did so be-
cause FSOC failed to consider whether the costs of imposing prudential regu-
lation on MetLife would exceed the benefits of doing so.252 FSOC would 
likely face comparable litigation costs if it were to designate a hedge fund as 
a SIFI, particularly because the industry has been vehemently opposed to the 
costs of prudential regulation. With all of the challenges that FSOC has en-
countered in regulating systemically harmful hedge funds, it is worth investi-
gating whether a different framework administered by an existing regulatory 
agency could better handle the task. 
2. Continued Systemic Threat of Hedge Funds 
The inability of FSOC to designate a hedge fund as a SIFI, coupled with 
the SEC’s limited jurisdiction over the industry, has effectively created a 
hedge fund loophole. Aside from the minimal transparency mandate provided 
via Advisers Act registration, hedge funds that pose a systemic threat to the 
economy escape effective regulation. This is problematic for two reasons. 
First, in spite of recent reports that hedge funds cannot effectively beat the 
markets, the industry is likely to grow significantly in coming years. Second, 
post-financial crisis studies have predominantly found that systemic risk is 
still a growing concern in the hedge fund industry. 
In assessing the growth of the industry, institutional investors are the 
primary investors in these private entities.253 It is admittedly difficult to pre-
dict the extent to which institutional investors will continue to rely on hedge 
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fund investments as an integral component to their underlying portfolios. 
Numerous reports have arisen regarding the inabilities of hedge funds to beat 
the markets, their excessive fees, and the undue complexity of their strate-
gies.254 These concerns have prompted prominent pension plans, such as the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) for example, 
to completely liquidate their hedge fund allocations.255 Most recently, the 
New York City pension fund liquidated its $1.5 billion hedge fund allocation 
due to concerns regarding “lagging performance, high fees and the riskiness 
of the asset class.”256 
In spite of these growing concerns, there is a strong likelihood that insti-
tutional investors will continue to pursue hedge funds, particularly during 
times of market distress. A 2015 study administered by J.P. Morgan found 
that ninety-four percent of such investors plan to maintain or increase hedge 
fund investments in the coming years.257 This anticipated growth could be 
related to the growing funding challenges that public pension plans are cur-
rently reconciling. These challenges have arisen due to past market turmoil, 
swelling life-spans, and the simultaneous retirement of millions of baby-
boomers.258 Furthermore, hedge funds tend to outperform the markets during 
economic downturns given their increased freedoms to engage in short-trading 
and other “hedging” strategies.259 As one source noted, “Dislocated markets, 
bear markets, inefficient markets are where hedge funds tend to do best, and 
these have not been the overall conditions during the slow and fragile recov-
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ery starting in 2009.”260 As such, the demand for hedge funds will likely grow 
when the markets inevitably start to decline.  
With respect to assessing whether hedge funds still pose a systemic 
threat to the economy, the research is not entirely conclusive on this issue. 
The Financial Services Authority in London has recently determined that 
hedge funds do not pose a systemic threat to the economy.261 Researchers 
have also encountered challenges in gathering relevant systemic risk data giv-
en the continued opaqueness of these private entities, which could potentially 
lead to inconclusive studies. Even with this limited data, a plethora of post-
crisis studies have confirmed that private funds can indeed contribute to sys-
temic risk for the same reasons discussed in Part III.A of this Article. Interna-
tional administrators, such as the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) have con-
cluded that private funds could in fact enhance systemic risk irrespective of 
the existing regulations over counterparties and OTC derivatives. On March 
4, 2015, the FSB and IOSCO published a consultation study which noted the 
following: 
[I]t is still possible for an investment fund to become highly lever-
aged through derivatives that are not centrally-cleared, particularly 
if margining practices for the non-centrally cleared derivatives are 
inadequate. Hence leverage constitutes a central component in the 
analysis of the counterparty channel, particularly for those funds 
that are not subject to any restrictions and may build up significant 
leverage positions (e.g. private funds).262 
In terms of assessing interconnectedness, an empirical study published in 
January 2010 sought to investigate the extent to which contagion exists with-
                                                                                                                           
 260 Brian Robinson, How Pension Plans Can Build the Case for Hedge Funds, PENSIONS & 
INVS. (Nov. 30, 2016, 2:01 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20161130/ONLINE/161139991/
how-pension-plans-can-build-the-case-for-hedge-funds [https://perma.cc/Q95X-KY8K]. 
 261 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ASSESSING THE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK FROM 
HEDGE FUNDS: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE HEDGE FUND SURVEY AND HEDGE FUND AS 
COUNTERPARTY SURVEY 1 (2011) (“The latest results suggest that the leverage of surveyed hedge 
funds remains largely unchanged and that their footprint remains modest within most markets, so 
that current risks to financial stability through the market channel seem limited at the time of the 
latest surveys.”). The Managed Fund Association (“MFA”) has similarly argued that the existing 
regulation of their investment bank counterparties, as well as the new clearing requirements for 
OTC-derivatives, sufficiently deters excessive leverage. Managed Funds Ass’n, MFA Comments 
on Significantly Systemic Institutions (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/2.25.11-MFA.letter.on_.systemically.significant.institutions.pdf [https://perma.
cc/JPK4-EEN2]. 
 262 FIN. STABILITY BD., CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2ND): ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 
FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK NON-INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 33 (2015). 
2017] Closing the Hedge Fund Loophole 681 
in the hedge fund industry.263 The study defines contagion “as correlation that 
cannot be explained by economic fundamentals”264 and it found “very strong 
evidence of contagion in hedge fund returns.”265 An additional study pub-
lished in November 2011 sought to further analyze potential linkages between 
hedge funds, banks, insurance companies, and broker-dealers.266 The study 
used empirical models to investigate the extent to which the returns of these 
distinct sectors are interconnected irrespective of their fundamental differ-
ences. It essentially concluded that “all four sectors have become highly inter-
related, increasing the channels through which shocks can propagate through-
out the finance and insurance sectors.”267 Thus, it is plausible that a systemic 
risk event that occurs at one particular hedge fund can quickly spread to other 
hedge funds, and to other intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies, 
and broker-dealers. 
In response to this ongoing debate, Professors Wulf Kaal and Timothy 
Krause summarized the post-crisis research on hedge funds and systemic 
risk.268 In their review of the literature on this topic, they essentially conclud-
ed, “Despite the mixed evidence produced by government reports . . . , the 
majority of post-crisis evidence provided by leading financial economists 
suggests that hedge funds may play a role in introducing at least some sys-
temic risk into the financial system.”269 With mounting evidence supporting 
the conclusion that systemic risk can be created and transmitted by hedge 
funds, and a strong likelihood that the industry will continue to grow, Con-
gress should act expeditiously to resolve the hedge fund loophole created by 
FSOC’s shortcomings. 
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III. THE SEC AS THE NEXT BEST ALTERNATIVE 
Given FSOC’s inability to designate a hedge fund as a SIFI, this Article 
argues that Congress should explore appointing the SEC as the primary regu-
lator of systemic risk because: (1) hedge funds can still create and transmit 
systemic risk as highlighted in the preceding section of this Article; (2) the 
transparency framework inherent in the federal securities laws can supply a 
more effective means for mitigating systemic risk than the prudential frame-
work currently mandated for SIFIs; and (3) appointing the SEC in this regard 
would reduce the fragmentation of the current regulatory structure that has 
been extended and complicated by the creation of FSOC. Part III thus begins 
by investigating the underexplored role that transparency plays in ensuring 
financial stability and protecting against future financial crises.270 It then ex-
plains how enhancing transparency to hedge fund counterparties and inves-
tors with respect to systemic risk data could empower such market partici-
pants to better protect themselves against risk, which could, in turn, weed out 
SIFIs from the marketplace.271 Part III concludes by expanding on the second 
component of this thesis as the SEC has historically managed the asset man-
agement industry over the past century.272 Reforming existing regulators is 
perhaps preferable to the creation of new agencies that will likely produce 
duplicative and ineffective regulation.273 
A. Federal Securities Laws as a Means to Mitigate Systemic Risk 
1. Transparency Can Improve Financial Stability 
As discussed in Part I of this Article, increasing transparency is the pri-
mary objective of the federal securities laws.274 In passing these laws, Con-
gress sought to equip investors with material information related to prospec-
tive investments in publicly traded companies. Issuers that fail to disclose 
such information are subject to the civil liability provisions provided under 
these laws. Congress then appointed the SEC as the administrative body 
charged with effectuating this investor protection mandate. In addition to 
promoting investor protection, mandatory disclosure rules help to improve 
market efficiency by improving the accuracy of share prices and by boosting 
investor confidence. Shareholders quickly respond to publicly released in-
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formation, including the material information that is mandated under federal 
securities laws. As such, the underlying prices of publicly offered securities 
are more likely to reflect their true values. Investor confidence is also boosted 
through this mandatory disclosure system as investors are more willing to 
allocate their limited capital to a market that is fair and reliable, thereby in-
creasing the liquidity of the markets.275 
In a similar vein, improving transparency can be an effective regulatory 
tool in reducing systemic risk, especially considering that the financial crisis 
was uniquely characterized by information asymmetries amongst sophisticat-
ed market participants. During the crisis, investment banks repackaged toxic 
subprime mortgages into complex OTC derivatives that were exempt from 
significant regulatory oversight.276 Securitizing debt in this manner allowed 
banks to transfer the risk of the toxic subprime mortgages to other counterpar-
ties.277 This transfer, however, only served to spread the risk throughout the 
entire financial system as investors would purchase and often resell these 
complex derivatives without knowing the true value and/or risks posed by 
these instruments.278 Investors would rely on third-party credit rating agen-
cies to produce valuations for OTC derivatives, many of which proved to be 
grossly inaccurate.279 This continuous chain of transactions is frequently re-
ferred to as the shadow banking system because it allowed entities to partici-
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pate in the transmission of credit without being subject to significant regula-
tion. 
One commentator identified the lack of transparency associated with the 
shadow banking industry as being the primary contributor to the crisis. Ac-
cording to Steve Denning, “After Lehman’s collapse, no one could under-
stand any particular bank’s risks from derivative trading and so no bank 
wanted to lend to or trade with any other bank . . . . [N]o one could tell 
whether any particular financial institution might suddenly implode.”280 The 
opaqueness of these exposures essentially led to a run on financial institu-
tions, because investors could not distinguish amongst the riskiness of these 
counterparties.281 It also led to a severe credit crunch where banks completely 
froze their lending channels regardless of the credit-worthiness of the bor-
rower.282 Regulators encountered significant difficulties in untangling the 
complex chain of transactions that facilitated the crisis given the opacity these 
markets. Scholars across disciplines have advocated for enhanced transparen-
cy as a means to prevent a future crisis of this magnitude.283 Mary Schapiro, 
the former chairman of the SEC, has likewise stated that systemic risk could 
be mitigated by “the traditional oversight, regulation, market transparency 
and enforcement provided by primary regulators that helps keep systemic risk 
from developing in the first place.”284 
Even with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, several commentators are 
still concerned that the continued lack of transparency with respect to OTC 
derivatives will inevitably lead to a future financial crisis. These criticisms 
warrant further investigation because the OTC derivatives market has contin-
ued to grow in recent years. Some have estimated that the notional value of 
OTC derivatives has grown from $500 trillion in 2007, to close to $707 tril-
lion in 2011.285 The new clearing mandate under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act could introduce a degree of transparency and standardization for certain 
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OTC derivative instruments. Yet, some scholars have argued that these new 
reforms could actually serve to concentrate systemic risk amongst these new-
ly authorized central clearinghouses, as opposed to eliminating it from the 
markets.286 Moreover, several OTC derivatives are excluded from this new 
clearing requirement even though many such uncleared instruments “are of-
ten vital cogs in the risk management strategies of corporates, insurance com-
panies, pension funds, sovereigns, smaller financial institutions and oth-
ers.”287 These uncleared derivatives are indeed subject to new margin re-
quirements under recent regulatory reforms, which can undoubtedly add an 
additional layer of protection against counterparty defaults.288 During a finan-
cial downturn, however, there is always a risk that the losses of a particular 
trade could greatly exceed the amount of any posted margin. Systemic shocks 
can also lead to wide-spread margin calls that perpetuate the liquidity spirals 
discussed in Part II.A.3. above. 
The Volker Rule is yet another reform passed under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which forces banks to eliminate its proprietary trading activities and to spin 
off any hedge-fund subsidiaries to outside parties.289 This reform, however, 
could perhaps have the following unintended consequence: 
In the future, the hedge fund sector will only grow in size and im-
portance, since the Volcker rule of the Dodd-Frank Act requires 
banks to spin off their proprietary trading desks and their internal 
asset management divisions into stand-alone hedge funds. As a re-
sult, hedge funds will be the only source of sophisticated and rela-
tively unconstrained capital, thus making them perhaps the main li-
quidity providers across a variety of markets.290 
                                                                                                                           
 286 See Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. 
REV. 185, 226 (2013) (predicting that “[i]f a clearinghouse member with a large volume of con-
tracts or a series of members whose transaction constitutes a significant volume of contracts 
should default, the clearinghouse may face insolvency or bankruptcy”). 
 287 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, SIZES & USES OF NON-CLEARED DERIVATIVES 
MARKET—AN ISDA STUDY 3 (2014). 
 288 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Partici-
pants, 81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23, 140). 
 289 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 469, 469–70 (2013) (outlining the basics of the Volcker rule by stating that it “restricts U.S. 
depository institutions and their affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading, subject to certain 
enumerated exemptions, and limits their sponsorship of and investment in hedge funds and other 
private funds”). 
 290 Stephen Brown et al., Hedge Funds After Dodd-Frank, NYU LEONARD N. STERN SCH. OF 
BUS. (July 19, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/hedge-
funds-after-doddfrank.html [https://perma.cc/K5Z6-U9FP]; see also Linette Lopez, The Financial 
Products That Blew up the Global Economy Are Sliding into the Shadow Banking System, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 8, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hedge-funds-pick-up-credit-
 
686 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:639 
The heightened capital requirements promulgated under Basel III will argua-
bly have a similar effect on the hedge fund industry.291 Although Basel III 
introduced higher capital requirements, and other stringent reforms for bank-
ing entities, there is some evidence that hedge funds are now playing a larger 
role in supplying credit and performing other functions in the credit interme-
diation process.292 As these criticisms and unintended consequences continue 
to unfold, Congress, under the direction of its regulators, should vigorously 
investigate the extent to which increasing transparency can play a larger role 
in mitigating systemic risk. 
2. Counterparties 
With respect to the hedge fund industry, Congress should similarly in-
vestigate whether enhancing transparency could more appropriately address 
the unique systemic risk concerns discussed herein. Although FSOC has not-
ed significant improvements in the leverage practices of hedge funds, the 
council expressed doubts as to whether hedge fund counterparties can fully 
understand the associated risks of transacting with these entities. The FSOC 
Report specifically noted that “individual counterparties may lack a complete 
picture of a fund’s exposures, as many hedge funds have relationships with 
multiple prime brokers and derivatives dealers.”293 Each of these dealers may 
also be subject to regulation by different agencies across a range of jurisdic-
tions. As a result, “no single regulator has a complete window into the risk 
profile of hedge funds.”294 If regulators cannot effectively assess the risks of 
hedge funds, even with the new registration requirements promulgated under 
the Dodd-Frank Act, it is certainly plausible that financial intermediaries en-
counter comparable difficulties. 
Hedge fund counterparties are admittedly highly sophisticated prime 
brokerage firms that often perform extensive due diligence on prospective 
relationships. Yet, lenders have frequently questioned whether they have suf-
ficient expertise to assess the creditworthiness of funds given the complexity 
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of their strategies and operations.295 One dealer specifically noted that “[t]he 
management and control of credit risks in the relationship between prime 
brokers and hedge funds represents one of the most challenging areas for the 
corporate credit function of investment banks.”296 These challenges frequent-
ly arise from the complex strategies employed by hedge funds, which are of-
ten dynamic in nature. Moreover, there is no standardized format for measur-
ing or reporting the various types of risks generated by these strategies.297 
Such risks can relate to leverage, volatility, liquidity, and interconnected-
ness.298 With respect to leverage for example, it is frequently incurred through 
the trading of securitized debt instruments, which are exempt from standard-
ized reporting mechanisms. These OTC derivatives can pose the greatest 
threat to financial stability as they are often used to transform and redistribute 
debt to a large number of market participants. Overall, the lack of standardi-
zation can make it difficult for counterparties to effectively price and aggre-
gate their collective risk exposures to hedge funds. A failure to appropriately 
assess risk in this regard can quickly spread to other financial institutions giv-
en the increasing interconnectedness of the markets. 
In a similar vein, assessing the extent to which a particular hedge fund is 
interconnected with other financial intermediaries is also a difficult metric for 
counterparties to measure. They would need information on a fund’s exposure 
to other counterparties, and the extent to which funds are interconnected with 
other hedge funds, insurance companies, and broker-dealers. Even if counter-
parties request such detailed information, they are unlikely to receive it as it is 
probably deemed proprietary and confidential. Yet, interconnectedness is a 
highly informative risk metric because it affects the extent to which lenders 
are exposed to “counterparty risk externality.” This term has been defined by 
scholars as “the effect that the default risk on one contract will be increased if 
the counterparty agrees to any contract with another agent which increases 
the probability that the counterparty will be unable to perform on the first 
one.”299 If, for example, a hedge enters into a swap transaction with Prime 
Broker A, and the hedge fund subsequently enters into a comparable contract 
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with Prime Broker B without notifying Prime Broker A, a failure to pay 
Prime Broker B could expose Prime Broker A to unforeseen losses. A lack of 
transparency with respect to additional trading relationships can make it diffi-
cult for counterparties to “charge price schedules that effectively penalize the 
creation of inefficient levels of counterparty risk.”300 
Network science can provide useful insights as to how increased trans-
parency could assist in identifying interconnected firms. Physicists have ap-
plied technology used by Google as a mechanism to identify firms that are 
highly connected.301 This algorithm is commonly referred to as “PageRank” 
and it ranks the relevance of websites by measuring the extent to which they 
are linked to other websites.302 Thus, when an internet user types a particular 
keyword into the Google search engine, the websites that are the most inter-
connected with others are the first to appear.303 In loosely applying this tech-
nology to banks, physicists have developed an algorithm called “DebtRank,” 
which similarly measures the extent to which financial institutions are inter-
connected with other institutions within a particular network.304 They used 
publicly available data with respect to Federal Reserve emergency loans 
granted to a subset of financial institutions to determine the interconnected-
ness of these entities. In order to effectively apply this algorithm to a large 
number of institutions on an ongoing basis, however, researchers would need 
access to publicly available information related to the indebtedness of each of 
these firms. As stated by additional researchers in this area, “[n]odes in a fi-
nancial network, such as banks, cannot assess the true risks associated with 
lending to other nodes in the network unless they have full information on the 
riskiness of all other nodes.”305 
A similar concept could be applied to the hedge fund industry to meas-
ure the extent to which each fund is interconnected with other intermediaries. 
Counterparties would then be incentivized to transact with funds that have a 
lower DebtRank so as to decrease their exposure to interconnected funds. 
Transacting with funds with a higher DebtRank would also increase the 
DebtRank of the counterparty, thereby decreasing its own attractiveness to 
other market participants. These incentives would effectively marginalize 
funds that are excessively interconnected. There are of course practical limita-
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tions in applying this framework to the hedge fund industry as these entities 
are even more opaque and heterogeneous than banks. It would also entail 
gathering confidential data from other categories of counterparties such as 
insurance companies and broker-dealers. Implementing such a widespread 
transparency mandate may not be politically feasible because each respective 
industry will strongly assert that such information is proprietary. As will be 
further discussed in Part III.A.4 below, however, the SEC could promulgate 
streamlined disclosure requirements that effectively consider the proprietary 
nature of fund strategies. It should also be noted that hedge fund advisers can 
be equally concerned with the creditworthiness of its funds’ own prime bro-
ker counterparties. This Article, however, generally posits that enhanced 
transparency mechanisms should be equally applied to all entities that partici-
pate in the chain of transactions that comprise the shadow banking industry. A 
systemic threat could potentially originate within any of these entities along 
this chain of transactions. 
3. Investors 
Institutional investors such as pension plans, insurance companies, and 
endowments comprise the bulk of hedge fund investors. Although these in-
vestors are highly sophisticated and typically perform extensive due diligence 
on prospective investments, they have expressed comparable concerns in un-
derstanding the complexities of hedge fund strategies. For instance, certain 
OTC derivatives must be valued by intricate computer algorithms that could 
take days to produce a valuation.306 Because these valuations are not stand-
ardized, counterparties that are sitting on opposing sides of an OTC derivative 
contract could yield different values for the same interest.307 A 2009 study 
that was conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office 
concluded that “some market participants suggested that not all prospective 
investors have the capacity or retain the expertise to analyze the information 
they receive from hedge funds.”308 Most recently, many institutional investors 
have publicly acknowledged their failures to properly assess the fees that are 
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charged by hedge fund advisers.309 Many such investors have lost millions of 
dollars in “hidden” hedge fund fees that were simply unaccounted for in their 
initial and ongoing due diligence of such funds.310 
In terms of measuring risk, hedge fund investors have encountered com-
parable challenges as described in the preceding section.311 This issue has 
been highlighted by Mark J.P. Anson, formerly a senior investment officer 
with CalPERS. He has specifically stated that “there is no standard platform 
for measuring risk and no standard format for reporting it. Different hedge 
funds map risk differently. Consequently, the risks of several hedge fund 
managers cannot be combined.”312 Thus, even if investors use considerable 
resources in investigating a single fund, or even a subset of funds, they still 
can encounter difficulties in optimizing their risk exposure to this industry. 
For instance, Hedge Fund A could earn the same returns as Hedge Fund B. 
Hedge Fund A, however, may employ a higher degree of leverage in order to 
produce the same returns as Hedge Fund B. Because reporting leverage is not 
standardized, investors could potentially select Hedge Fund A without know-
ing that Hedge Fund B could produce the same result without incurring the 
same degree of risk. 
On its face, equipping hedge fund investors with standardized risk dis-
closures appears to be an investor protection issue. This interpretation would 
be consistent with traditional divisions between laws that enhance investor 
protection and those that reduce systemic risk. Equipping investors with a 
mechanism to appropriately price and manage risk, however, could serve to 
dis-incentivize excessive risk-taking by hedge fund advisers. More specifical-
ly, mandating standardized risk disclosures would essentially give investors a 
mechanism to more easily distinguish between “bad” and “good” managers 
of risk. Investors would likewise be incentivized to categorize advisers of 
systemically harmful funds as “bad” managers of risk as they could expose 
investors to excessive losses during an economic downturn. Such advisers 
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would therefore encounter more difficulties in soliciting investors and would 
effectively be pushed out of the market. 
4. Framework 
Outlining the specific structure of the systemic risk disclosure system 
proposed herein is largely outside the scope of this Article. Even still, this 
section provides preliminary thoughts on how the SEC should go about un-
dertaking this task. First, the SEC should form a committee that is specifically 
dedicated to this complicated and unique endeavor. This committee should be 
comprised of experts from a range of disciplines, such as legal, economic, 
financial, banking, and quantitative analysis. Because the strategies and in-
struments traded by hedge funds are complex and perhaps poorly understood 
by regulators, the SEC should expand its knowledge base to experts outside 
the regulatory field. This committee could also be formed as a subset of the 
Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”), which was created in 
September 2009 to “integrate financial economics and rigorous data analytics 
into the core mission of the SEC.”313 DERA is well positioned to supervise 
this new committee as it has already engaged a variety of academic disci-
plines to assist the SEC in better understanding the evolving innovations un-
der the agency’s jurisdiction.314 
The committee’s first task should entail determining the appropriate reg-
istration threshold for hedge funds that will be required to comply with this 
new transparency mandate. As it stands now, a hedge fund must have over 
$50 billion in consolidated assets in order to be considered a SIFI. This 
threshold fails to capture smaller funds that could be heavily interconnected 
with other intermediaries. The registration threshold should be significantly 
lower than $50 billion, although the committee should thoroughly investigate 
the costs and benefits of implementing such disclosure requirements for a 
wide range of funds. 
In conjunction with developing this threshold, the committee should un-
dertake the arduous task of developing the specific disclosure form that enti-
ties would use to report systemic risk data. The items on this form could in 
fact parallel the factors that FSOC currently evaluates to determine whether a 
hedge fund would qualify as a SIFI. As previously discussed, these factors 
are: (i) size, (ii) interconnectedness, (iii) substitutability, (iv) leverage, and (v) 
liquidity risk.315 The committee would of course have to develop bright-line 
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and standardized methodologies for determining and disclosing these metrics. 
In developing a disclosure framework for interconnectedness, the committee 
could for example integrate the DebtRank concept explained in Part 
III.A.2.316 Compiling the disclosures related to leverage would necessarily 
entail coordination with the CFTC because it has jurisdiction over many of 
the derivatives that would likely be incorporated into this calculation. 
Considering the propriety needs of hedge funds is also an integral com-
ponent of this analysis. To this end, the committee should explore creative 
reporting mechanisms such as reporting aggregated data, as opposed to de-
tailed position data, or permitting time delays with respect to certain disclo-
sures. A short and concise disclosure form would also be ideal, so that inves-
tors and counterparties can easily compare a large range of entities. The 
committee must necessarily determine the frequency that hedge funds must 
complete such reports which can be monthly, quarterly, or annually. Deter-
mining the appropriate consequences for failing to report such disclosures, or 
reporting false or misleading information, would be yet another task for the 
committee. 
5. Potential Drawbacks 
a. Herding 
Even with standardized risk disclosures, there is still an inherent risk that 
investors will continue to allocate to profitable funds that pose a systemic 
threat to the economy. Advisers of such funds could easily be identified as 
“good” managers of risk, particularly during times of economic prosperity 
where speculative bubbles are more likely to arise. If this were to occur, there 
is a related risk that investors will “herd” towards such systemically harmful 
strategies to benefit from the potentially higher returns. Some scholars have 
described “herds” as investors and managers “that charge into risky ventures 
without adequate information and appreciation of the risk-reward trade-offs,” 
which often “results from an obvious intent by investors to copy the behavior 
of other investors.”317 
Institutional investors such a pension plans, insurance companies, and 
endowments, however, comprise the bulk of hedge fund investors318 and they 
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are typically held to higher fiduciary standards on behalf of their underlying 
constituents. These heightened fiduciary duties incentivize these investors to 
make rational investment decisions, which could foreclose the possibility of a 
herd forming within the hedge fund industry. Pension plans for example are 
subject to the duty of prudence, which requires that plan trustees utilize rea-
sonable expertise and diligence in selecting investment allocations.319 This 
essentially requires that pension plan trustees utilize reasonable expertise and 
diligence in selecting investment allocations for pension plan portfolios to 
protect beneficiaries from excessive losses.320 These fiduciary duties also in-
duce institutional investors to diversify the risks of their underlying invest-
ments. Having access to standardized risk disclosures would provide institu-
tional investors with an integral tool in optimizing their risk exposures across 
a larger range of hedge fund investments. Although a systemically harmful 
fund may be profitable in the short-run, hedge fund investors that are subject 
to stringent fiduciary duties must also consider the impact to long-term prof-
itability. 
The recent proliferation of lawsuits related to fiduciary breaches could 
further incentivize institutional investors to sufficiently evaluate risks as op-
posed to simply following a herd. For example, employees of M.I.T., Yale 
and NYU have recently sued plan administrators for “fail[ing] to monitor ex-
cessive fees paid to administer the plans and [] not replac[ing] more expen-
sive, poor-performing investments with cheaper ones.”321 In considering the 
proposed model herein, the standardized risk disclosures would be publicly 
available on the SEC’s website. As a result, the underlying beneficiaries of 
such institutional investors would have unfettered access to the information 
they would need in order to assert a fiduciary breach related to a “wrongful” 
allocation to a systemically harmful fund. 
Mandating standardized risk disclosures could also reduce the category 
of herding related to the reputation of a particular adviser. This “reputation-
based herding” occurs when an investor “[is] uncertain of the manager’s abil-
ity to pick the right stocks” and thus, conforms with the decisions of other 
investors in selecting optimal investments.322 One study found that this kind 
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of herding is more likely to occur in emerging markets “where the environ-
ment is relatively opaque because of weak reporting requirements, lower ac-
counting standards, lax enforcement of regulations, and costly information 
acquisition, informational cascades and reputational herding are more likely 
to arise.”323 In many ways, the hedge fund industry is similar to these emerg-
ing markets as it is still largely opaque. Although many hedge fund advisers 
must now register under the Advisers Act, the requisite disclosures do not 
mandate the disclosure of systemic risk data to its investors. Hedge funds are 
also excluded from complying with Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples in preparing its financial statements. Thus, the calculation of valuations, 
fees, and risk are not subject to a uniform and standardized reporting system. 
This can make it exceedingly difficult for investors to optimize hedge fund 
allocations, even if they utilize significant resources to investigate a subset of 
funds. Given these unique information asymmetries, there is a heightened risk 
that investors would allocate to advisers based on the reputation within this 
niche community, as opposed to sufficiently evaluating the risks of a large 
range of hedge funds. Mandating standardized risk disclosures could, there-
fore, mitigate this category of reputational herding as it would provide inves-
tors with a reliable mechanism for optimizing hedge fund allocations. 
b. Proprietary Information 
Mandating such a disclosure system could admittedly elicit considerable 
pushback from the industry as advisers would likely deem such information 
proprietary. To address these concerns, the SEC should explore creative re-
porting mechanisms such as reporting aggregated data, as opposed to detailed 
position data and/or trading algorithms, or permitting time delays with respect 
to certain disclosures. Implementing a mandatory disclosure system can also 
be less destructive than the severe capital restrictions imposed under the SIFI 
designation process. Hedge fund advisers might prefer providing such 
streamlined disclosures as opposed to complying with stringent capital re-
strictions that could destroy their abilities to pursue innovative strategies. 
A mandatory disclosure system, which is well-tailored to the proprietary 
needs of hedge funds, could even benefit the industry by attracting more in-
vestors. They would perhaps be more willing to allocate assets to hedge funds 
because standardized risk disclosures would enable them to more effectively 
distinguish amongst the thousands of hedge funds that are currently available 
for investment. In a market where institutional investors such as CalPERS are 
withdrawing from the industry in droves, this benefit is certainly worth inves-
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tigating. As discussed in Part III.A.3, many institutional investors have re-
cently withdrawn their hedge fund allocations due to the difficulties of under-
standing the complexity of hedge fund fees and strategies. Relatedly, hedge 
fund advisers could use this as an opportunity to distinguish themselves from 
their peers particularly if advisers can produce comparable returns with lower 
degrees of systemic risk. 
Some empirical research even suggests that transparency mandates 
could enhance the value of affected firms, which could obviously be a desira-
ble result for hedge fund advisers. For example, one study examined the ef-
fects of the 1964 Securities Act amendments on firms that were required to 
comply with this new legislation.324 These amendments included mandatory 
disclosures for a certain subset of firms that traded OTC securities. The re-
sults of this study revealed the following: 
Overall, the results suggest that the benefits of the 1964 Amend-
ments substantially outweighed the cost of complying with this law 
as measured by stock returns. This implies that the affected firms 
were not managed to maximize shareholder value prior to 1964. . . . 
Regardless of the exact channel, these findings are consistent with 
the notion that mandatory disclosure laws can cause managers to 
more narrowly focus on maximization of shareholder value.325 
Perhaps the increased scrutiny from both regulators and investors that results 
from the process of producing mandatory disclosures, forces advisers to more 
heavily prioritize shareholder value. In either case, the hedge fund industry 
could strongly benefit from the increased value that could result from com-
plying with a mandatory disclosure system. 
c. Limited Impact of Disclosures 
Many commentators and scholars have criticized the effectiveness of 
disclosures for a variety of reasons. Some have asserted that investors simply 
do not read mandated disclosures, and even if they do read such disclosures, 
investors do not react rationally to the provided information.326 They may 
disregard warnings associated with investing in risky assets, or fail to process 
                                                                                                                           
 324 Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities 
Act Amendments 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11478, 2005), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11478. 
 325 Id. 
 326 See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 599, 603 (2013) (arguing in part that “many investors, even sophisticated investors, do not 
start with cautious or neutral presumptions about a security and do not carefully read the disclo-
sure to appraise the security on its merits before deciding whether to invest”). 
696 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:639 
material information that may have a significant impact on their investments. 
In a similar vein, the “information overload theory” has emerged within this 
scholarly discourse which strongly suggests that regulators should pull back 
on disclosure requirements because investors have been “blinded by the light” 
with voluminous and perhaps unnecessary information that makes it difficult 
for investors to make optimal investment decisions.327 
Hedge fund investors are distinctive from retail investors, however, in 
that they are mostly comprised of highly sophisticated investors who are 
bound by fiduciary obligations to select prudent investments. They are also 
more likely to access and process mandated disclosures, which has been sup-
ported by empirical research.328 With respect to the “information overload” 
theory, it is difficult to apply this theory to the hedge fund industry because it 
has been historically opaque. Hedge funds are distinctive from publicly trad-
ed companies in that they are typically exempt from the Securities Act, Ex-
change Act, and 1940 Act. Thus, hedge fund investors have not been over-
loaded with information mandated under the federal securities laws. The dis-
closures proposed herein would not alter this reality as the proposal empha-
sizes the need for a short and concise disclosure statement. In fact, institu-
tional investors have been increasingly demanding additional transparency 
from hedge fund advisers given the complexity of the industry. As one survey 
noted, “In surveying 303 major institutional investors and 118 hedge funds 
. . . 55 percent of institutional investors would like additional transparency 
into their hedge fund investments.”329 Another survey found that “82 percent 
of respondents reported an increase in demand for transparency from inves-
tors, while 88 percent said investors are demanding greater due diligence.”330 
The mandatory disclosure framework proposed in this Article can serve to 
meet the growing demand of institutional investors for greater transparency. 
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In addition, the mere act of calculating and disclosing systemic risk data 
could deter hedge fund advisers from engaging in excessive risk. Because 
many hedge fund advisers must now register under the Advisers Act, they are 
subject to random inspections by the SEC. Hedge fund advisers that report 
high systemic risk exposure could be subject to increased scrutiny by the 
agency. Relatedly, hedge fund advisers may also be incentivized to minimize 
systemic risk to avoid future regulation by Congress. If a systemically harm-
ful hedge fund were to fail, additional regulations would likely follow given 
the draconian Congressional response that often results from a financial ca-
lamity. Recent studies have further demonstrated that mandated disclosures 
can have a positive impact on the quality of management. For example, one 
such study examined whether increased transparency regarding CEO com-
pensation improved the effectiveness of board management.331 The study ul-
timately found that “disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring 
executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance”332 
and the authors reasoned that “[disclosure] facilitates the monitoring of man-
agement and hence causes managers to act more in the interests of sharehold-
ers.”333 Having to calculate and disclosure systemic risk data could similarly 
incentivize hedge fund advisers to more closely scrutinize the extent to which 
they engage in systemically harmful practices. 
B. Reducing Fragmentation of Regulatory Agencies 
Even if one agrees with the systemic risk disclosure framework pro-
posed in this Article, many may argue that FSOC is the ideal regulatory agen-
cy to effectuate this task, particularly because the SEC has failed to prevent 
several notable scandals that led to crippling losses. The Madoff scandal is 
perhaps the most glaring example of the SEC’s shortcomings as Madoff’s 
Ponzi scheme flew under the agency’s radar for several years, even though he 
was registered under the Advisers Act and therefore subject to SEC inspec-
tions.334 Investors lost billions of dollars when Madoff’s Ponzi scheme even-
tually unraveled.335 Nevertheless, this Article argues that lawmakers should 
instead dedicate resources to reforming the existing agencies instead of creat-
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ing additional layers of ineffective regulation that could lead to repeated fail-
ures, undue complexities, and wasted resources. With FSOC’s failure to des-
ignate a hedge fund as a SIFI over the past six years, FSOC’s jurisdiction 
over the asset management industry has likely produced these problematic 
results. 
By and large, granting systemic risk authority to the SEC could serve to 
reduce the fragmentation of the regulatory agencies that has arguably led to 
inefficient and redundant regulations. As previously discussed, the regulatory 
structure is highly fragmented, especially in comparison to other jurisdictions. 
The SEC holds primary responsibility for regulating securities, while the 
CFTC regulates futures and derivatives. These agencies further delegate cer-
tain regulatory functions to self-regulatory organizations such as FINRA and 
NFA, which creates additional registration requirements for broker-dealers 
and future commission merchants. As a result, many investment funds have to 
either separately register with or obtain exemptions from each of these enti-
ties, as well as other regulatory agencies in international jurisdictions. With 
the creation of FSOC, investment funds are potentially subject to oversight by 
yet an additional federal agency. If a fund is designated as a SIFI, the Federal 
Reserve would also have oversight over the industry. This fragmented regula-
tory system has led to a complex web of rules and regulations that are often 
overlapping and inefficient. 
Many scholars and regulators have advocated for further consolidation 
of regulators. Former SEC Commissioner Roberta S. Karmel has argued that 
consolidating the SEC with the CFTC would eliminate the jurisdictional bat-
tles that have hindered the effectiveness of these agencies.336 She further rea-
soned that a consolidated agency could more effectively regulate the growing 
complexities of the markets, and would better guard against the agency cap-
ture that has historically plagued regulators.337 The Department of Treasury 
similarly concluded that: 
Product and market participant convergence, market linkages, and 
globalization have rendered regulatory bifurcation of the futures 
and securities markets untenable, potentially harmful, and ineffi-
cient. To address this issue, the CFTC and the SEC should be 
merged to provide unified oversight and regulation of the futures 
and securities industries.338 
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Creating additional agencies to regulate the continuous innovations of in-
vestment funds may serve to exacerbate the issues identified by these com-
mentators. My future research will inevitably delve deeper into the potential 
benefits of a SEC/CFTC merger. 
Many commentators may argue that the SEC is too politicized to under-
take this task of developing standardized disclosures. For example, former 
SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher recently argued that the Dodd-Frank 
Act has created political divides within the agency as the many reforms man-
dated under this sweeping legislation are “ideologically driven rule-makings 
that reflect the partisan nature of the way the law was written.”339 FSOC, 
however, is also potentially deeply politicized as highlighted by Professor 
Christina Skinner.340 She specifically found that: 
The binary design of the designation power also makes the SIFI la-
bel vulnerable to political pressure. In requiring regulators to sort 
financial institutions into two buckets—systemically risky and 
not—in effect, a binary mechanism enables the assignment of regu-
latory “winners” and “losers.” Given that the FSOC is spearheaded 
by the Treasury Secretary—a political appointee who reports di-
rectly to the Administration in power—one can readily see the po-
tential for political factors to influence this sorting (that is, designa-
tion) process.341 
FSOC’s sweeping power to designate entities as SIFIs makes the possible 
politicization of this council even more troubling given the deleterious effect 
that such a designation can have on affected firms. The failure to designate a 
systemically harmful entity as a SIFI is also a troubling outcome that could 
result from the politicization of the council. Simply creating yet another 
agency comprised of regulatory chairpersons does not necessarily eliminate 
the risks of politicization. Congressional leaders should instead hold the exist-
ing agencies more accountable for effectuating its various mandates, and per-
haps provide additional resources for the agencies to do so. 
In terms of assessing the expertise of the SEC, the agency has regulated 
the investment fund industry over the past century. The SEC is intimately 
familiar with the specific nuances and complexities of investment funds, and 
it has expanded its knowledge over the private fund industry with the passage 
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of the Dodd-Frank Act. Industry participants such as advisers, lawyers, and 
accountants also have working relationships with the SEC, and imposing yet 
another regulator may create unanticipated costs for these parties that inevita-
bly get passed down to underlying investors. Moreover, the SEC has the 
structural framework in place to easily incorporate an additional disclosure 
form into its mandatory disclosure system. This form would be publicly 
available on its website. Although the SEC is historically an investor protec-
tion agency, FSOC seems to have deferred to the agency in terms of utilizing 
the 1940 Act to regulate systemic risk in the registered fund industry.342 
Overall, the SEC has taken a larger role in regulating systemic risk in the fi-
nancial markets. With the increasing relationship between investor protection 
and systemic risk, it is only natural that the SEC would expand its jurisdiction 
in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial innovation has blurred the distinction between private funds 
and banks. Academics have long debated how best to respond to this regula-
tory conundrum. Regulations previously made distinctions amongst the cate-
gories of entities that created systemic risk, the administrative agencies 
charged with regulating systemic risk, and the regulatory tools used to miti-
gate systemic risk. As it stands now, systemically harmful funds will in fact 
be regulated as banks if FSOC designates such fund as a SIFI. Yet, it is ques-
tionable whether the benefits of appointing a hedge fund in this manner 
would exceed the costs. Also, with the mounting challenges FSOC has en-
countered in utilizing this power, it is highly unlikely that a hedge fund will 
ever be designated as a SIFI. This has left a hedge fund loophole that existing 
regulators are preempted from closing. 
In response to these challenges, this Article argues that the SEC should 
be the regulator appointed by Congress to close this hedge fund loophole. In 
granting the SEC the authority to undertake this task, this Article recognizes 
that although the line between private funds and banks has indeed been 
blurred, it has not been eliminated. The SEC is better positioned to accom-
modate the fundamental differences between these two industries as it has 
regulated the investment fund industry for over seventy-five years. Moreover, 
the transparency framework inherent in the federal securities laws can be de-
ployed as a mechanism for more effectively reducing systemic risk, without 
disrupting the abilities of hedge fund advisers to pursue their innovative strat-
egies. This assertion necessarily entails exploring the relationship between 
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investor protection and systemic risk, which has been grossly neglected by 
researchers in this area. Nevertheless, this Article posits that standardizing 
risk disclosures for hedge fund investors and counterparties would provide 
these market participants with the necessary tools to better protect themselves 
against systemically harmful funds. This could in turn weed-out such funds 
from the marketplace. Developing appropriate disclosures would require ex-
perts from a range of fields such as economic, quantitative analysis, and fi-
nance. Creative solutions must be sufficiently explored given the complexi-
ties entailed in developing such disclosures. As financial innovations continue 
to unfold, researchers must continuously investigate these issues from a varie-
ty of perspectives. 
  
 
